Over the last year, the International Development Association (IDA), the arm of the World Bank that provides grants and concessional loans to the world’s poorest countries, has undergone its 21st replenishment (IDA21). This replenishment comes as the World Bank Group implements significant reforms aimed at becoming a “Better and Bigger Bank,” including by aligning IDA policy commitments with the new Corporate Scorecard. These priorities are reflected in the IDA21 Draft Replenishment Report, “Ending Poverty on a Living Planet: Delivering Impact with Urgency and Ambition,” released ahead of the final pledging session on December 5-6, 2024. This draft report details IDA’s policy commitments for the next three-year cycle, starting July 2025. BIC provided input on the draft report, emphasizing the importance of IDA in providing added value for the world’s poorest countries and the most marginalized groups within those countries. 

As the world faces compounding crises, including climate change, economic downturns, and the rise of authoritarianism and conflict, IDA plays an essential role in addressing our most critical development challenges and setting high standards across the field. IDA21 should build on IDA20 to include specific, actional policy commitments, as detailed above, that prioritize supporting all countries to adapt to climate change, the inclusion of marginalized groups, and accountability and transparency for IDA-funded projects. Such commitments would maximize IDA’s value to the citizens of borrowing countries and help fulfill countries’ unique development goals. An oversimplification of the IDA21 policy package by duplicating the Corporate Scorecard and increased emphasis on scale and speed without proportional accountability measures puts this impact at risk.

BIC’s comments on the IDA21 Draft Replenishment Report

BIC Provides Input on the IDA21 Draft Replenishment Report

As the World Bank assesses its progress after one-year of its claim to be Paris-aligned, it is an opportune time to reflect on how the process can be strengthened to be more aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement. The Bank has produced instrument and sector notes detailing how it will operationalize Paris alignment in lending instruments and in each sector. BIC has reviewed a number of sector notes (our recommendations can be found here). 

While reviewing the Transport Sector Note, we were concerned that the Note does not prohibit financing of internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles despite the need to reduce emissions by 80 to 97 percent in the next 26 years to limit warming. In addition, we found little to no recognition of how the vulnerability of transport systems to climate change will disproportionately affect marginalized groups, including persons with disabilities, who are most exposed to the negative consequences of climate change. The Note does not recognize different transport needs and how they can either support transport decarbonization efforts or lead to an increase in transport emissions. For instance, persons with disabilities may be more reliant on low-occupancy vehicles to meet their transport needs, leading to more vehicles on the road and higher greenhouse gas emissions. As the Bank designs and implements new transport operations that are Paris-aligned, these systems should be accessible to all. In this brief, we provide recommendations for the Bank to adopt a disability-inclusive approach to climate action in the transport sector. 

How Can the World Bank Integrate Climate Action and Disability Inclusion in Transport?

In March, the Biden Administration released its budget request for Fiscal Year 2025 (FY25), and on June 12th, the House Appropriations Committee approved its FY25 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPs) bill. While the Biden Administration's budget request meets existing commitments to the MDBs, the House bill fails to meet many MDB commitments and includes harmful climate provisions that would weaken the U.S.’s ability to push for better environmental impacts at the MDBs. Though the upcoming election means that appropriations negotiations may be even more difficult than last year’s contentious process, Congress should meet the existing commitments to the MDBs and exclude provisions that would lead the U.S. to renege on its climate commitments. Furthermore, Congress must push for stronger social, environmental, and accountability policies as conditions for potential Congressional support of general capital increases (GCIs) at the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IDB-Invest) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 

MDB commitments in the FY25 President’s Budget Request (PBR)

The FY25 PBR for the Treasury Department includes $1.93 billion for existing commitments to the World Bank and the regional multilateral development banks (MDBs). We call on Congress to appropriate the funding needed to meet U.S. commitments to the MDBs, including: 

$1.43 billion for the final contribution to the 20th replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA20). 

$54.6 million for the fifth of eight installments for the 7th capital increase at the African Development Bank (AfDB).

$206.5 million for the last of six installments for a capital increase at the World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). 

$43.6 million for the 12th replenishment of the Asian Development Fund (ADF). 

$197 million for the second of three installments for the 16th replenishment of the African Development Fund (AfDF). 

BIC encourages Capitol Hill to meet these existing commitments to preserve the US’s leadership role and ability to improve these institutions’ policies and practices.

GCI Authorization Requests in the FY25 PBR

The FY25 PBR also includes requests for authorization and contributions for two GCIs. GCIs inject new shareholder capital into the MDBs so the institutions can increase the volume of their lending. The request calls for a $75 million contribution and authorization of a $3.5 billion GCI for IDB-Invest, the private sector lending arm of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The GCI, approved by shareholders in March 2024, comes as the IDB implements its New Institutional Strategy, a series of reforms intended to increase the IDB’s overall impact. The request also calls for a $50 million contribution and authorization of a €4 billion GCI for the EBRD. This GCI, approved by shareholders in December 2023, comes as the EBRD revises its Environmental and Social Policy and Access to Information Policy. As these institutions engage in reforms and policy reviews, we call for Congress to push for stronger accountability and transparency standards if they authorize these capital increases. 

MDB provisions in the House FY25 SFOPs bill

In June, the House Appropriations Committee approved its SFOPs appropriations bill, which contains $1.55 billion for existing commitments to the World Bank and the regional MDBs. The bill includes climate provisions that would weaken the U.S.’s ability to meet its climate commitments and excludes MDB oversight provisions that inform how the Treasury must engage with the MDBs. Below are some of the key provisions and gaps within the House’s FY25 SFOPs bill: 

The House bill appropriates $1.1 billion for the last installment of the U.S. pledge to IDA20, over $300 million lower than needed to meet this year’s obligation. Reneging on the pledge will decrease the ability of the U.S. to push for stronger environmental, social, and accountability policies during the ongoing negotiations for the IDA21 replenishment package.

The House bill also appropriates over $20 million less than what is needed to meet this year’s obligations for both the AfDF and the AfDB. Failing to meet these commitments will hinder the U.S.’s ability to improve these institutions’ policies and practices.

The House version does not authorize the GCIs at IDB Invest and the EBRD. Should Congress decide to include these authorizations in the final package, Congressional support should be conditioned on requiring both banks to improve their social, environmental, and accountability policies. 

The House bill includes provisions that prohibit contributions to certain international environmental funds such as the Green Climate Fund and the Clean Technology Fund, blocks the use of funds for implementation of the Paris Agreement and loss and damage attributed to climate change, and prevents the application of Treasury’s Fossil Fuel Guidance for MDBs. BIC calls on Congress to remove these provisions to support the United States’ climate commitments. 

The House SFOPs bill fails to include oversight provisions that inform how the Treasury must engage with MDBs. The enacted FY24 SFOPs bill includes provisions that require the Treasury to push for additional oversight and analysis of large dam projects, withhold support for projects that would damage intact tropical forests, and only support projects that implement the best practices regarding environmental conservation, cultural protection, and empowerment of local populations. However, these provisions are absent in the FY25 House bill, and BIC calls for their inclusion in the final bill.

How does the FY25 House SFOPs bill and the FY25 President’s Budget Request meet U.S. commitments to the MDBs? 

Civil society organizations (CSOs) are valuable partners in monitoring the African Development Bank’s (AfDB) projects. They play an important role in holding the AfDB accountable and promoting inclusive, transparent, and sustainable development. However, the AfDB has largely fallen flat when it comes to providing civil society with a proper platform for participation over the years, particularly in its Annual Meetings. 

Since 2018, there has been a glaring lack of dedicated spaces for CSO participation in the meetings. This absence has created a deficiency for the AfDB in maximizing the effectiveness of its work, especially when considering the benefits engagement with CSOs has provided outside of the annual meetings. 

For instance, in Uganda, CSOs were instrumental in incorporating the needs of persons with disabilities into an AfDB-funded water supply and sanitation project, leading to more accessible infrastructure and enabling persons with disabilities to benefit from the project. 

In the Gambia, CSOs contributed to the Rice Value Chain Transformation Program by overseeing project implementation and advocating for an Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) that was responsive to environmental and social risks. More specifically, CSOs successfully advocated for the ESMP to include specific mitigation and response measures related to gender-based violence; sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment of children; and child labor to prevent harm to communities — social risks that were not initially included by the government or the AfDB. Addressing these risks better enables the project to contribute to the country’s development by preventing the generational impoverishment that violence against children is known to create.

The AfDB should build on the successes it has seen from working with CSOs in other aspects of its work. In the upcoming Annual Meetings, it must work to forge more robust, meaningful engagement with civil society, particularly groups that voice critical views.

The AfDB should facilitate greater engagement with CSOs and incorporate their research and opinions during the Annual Meetings and throughout all stages of policy and project development, including by:

Creating a forum for CSOs to share their opinions. The AfDB needs to carve out a space in which civil society can voice their concerns and provide recommendations on how the AfDB can be more responsive to the needs of communities. A system similar to the Civil Society Policy Forum (CSPF) that the World Bank uses in its Spring and Annual Meetings would give the AfDB a better perspective on the progress of its projects and objectives through the eyes of the people it hopes to benefit from its work. The Asian Development Bank similarly holds multiple sessions that integrate the voices of civil society into its annual meetings.

Bolstering their implementation plan for the Integrated Safeguard System (ISS) with civil society’s input. The ISS faces criticism for not fully integrating civil society's recommendations and concerns over the AfDB's ability to implement the ISS effectively. The AfDB can and should use the Annual Meetings as an opportunity to address these concerns and plan for a strong and inclusive ISS rollout process with the help of CSOs present at the meetings.

How can the AfDB better engage with Civil Society at its Annual Meetings?

Amidst a sector-wide reckoning following the pandemic's dramatic impact on tourism and travel, the World Bank released a policy note highlighting the need to invest towards "a more sustainable and resilient tourism industry post-COVID-19". Yet while recent projects have increasingly focused on acknowledging climate-related and environmental risks associated with travel and tourism systems, they often fail to address another major risk endemic to the tourism sector: child sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment (SEA/H).

Children living in travel hot spots that receive a continuous and large-scale influx of visitors are made significantly more vulnerable to sexual abuse and trafficking. Not only can large tourist populations contribute to the demand for commercial sexual exploitation of children, but the sector itself can unintentionally play a part in facilitating child SEA/H. As the UN Special Representative on Violence Against Children noted in her annual report, sexual offenders can misuse travel and tourism infrastructure, including transportation systems and accommodations, to traffick vulnerable children. Risk of SEA/H is exacerbated in areas with a high prevalence of child labor in service roles at hotels, restaurants, or public areas that expose them directly to tourists as part of their job.

World Bank projects that look to rebuild, diversify, and strengthen "sustainable tourism systems" must acknowledge that truly sustainable tourism must include the protection of children from any type of violence against children (VAC), SEA/H, and child labor. While some World Bank tourism projects acknowledge the sector's potential negative impact on children's safety and well-being in project documents, others fail to consider specific impacts on children and to include corresponding preventive measures in project design.

Below are four recommendations for the World Bank to mainstream child SEA/H prevention and response measures specific to the tourism sector:

Draw from the Bank's own best practice guidance for preventing and addressing child SEA/H in projects by including child-specific concerns in mitigation measures. Project documents for the Resilient Tourism and Blue Economy Development in Cabo Verde project explicitly acknowledge the sector's "risk of sexual abuse of minors, such as prostitution and child pornography… especially in the tourist islands." Yet, there is no indication that the project will employ child-specific measures to prevent SEA/H. For example, while the project plans to conduct "training on GBV standards in tourism" amongst stakeholders, it is unclear if this training will include the particular risks facing children in the sector or how to identify and respond appropriately to child SEA/H. The Bank previously published Good Practice Notes to provide detailed guidance for staff on how to support Borrowers in identifying and mitigating SEA/H risks in large infrastructure projects and human development operations. These notes advise Bank staff to pay particular attention to the risks faced by marginalized groups such as children, and recommend a variety of prevention and response measures informed by SEA/H risk assessments. Tourism projects should draw on this guidance to implement best practices around SEA/H prevention and adapt such measures to contain child-specific information and accessibility features.

Utilize the stakeholder engagement process to conduct safe and meaningful consultations with project-affected children, and sensitize those especially vulnerable to SEA/H risks. The World Bank's Tourism Diversification and Resilience project in the Gambia was rated as having "substantial" SEA/H risks, partially due to the vulnerability of children linked to the informal tourism sector. The project's Stakeholder Engagement Plan outlines plans to consult with the Gambia Child Protection Alliance on industry-specific recommendations for preventing child abuse. The project also plans to hold sensitization sessions with children working as street vendors on topics such as the GRM reporting process for project-related SEA/H. Other World Bank projects should follow this example and continue to work with Borrowers in tourism projects to create stakeholder engagement plans that include children, and CSOs that work with children, throughout the project cycle in safe, age- and culturally-appropriate spaces where their concerns can be heard and used to inform implementation.

Equip institutional coordination platforms to address tourism-related child SEA/H through a multi-sectoral approach. Tourism projects in Fiji and Zambia aim to improve coordination between various sector stakeholders, including through the creation of multi-sectoral mechanisms to harmonize activities and address gaps in the sector. However, these projects do not specify the inclusion of relevant government authorities on child protection, gender, trafficking, and child labor prevention in these coordination platforms, missing an opportunity to facilitate multi-sectoral collaboration on child SEA/H in tourism. The Bank should prioritize the participation of child protection actors in its sector-strengthening mechanisms, so that these bodies can build capacity on child SEA/H issues, raise awareness among representatives from other government agencies and the private sector, and create a multi-sectoral approach to addressing child SEA/H within the sector.

Acknowledge risks and assess capacity gaps when planning for the long term. As part of its work to build a more resilient and sustainable tourism industry, the World Bank uses some tourism projects to support countries such as Fiji and Cabo Verde in creating or updating long-term, sector-wide development plans. These plans are intended to address the social, cultural, and environmental risks of tourism growth. The Bank should work with Borrowers to integrate an assessment of context- and sector-specific SEA/H risks, especially towards children across its sector strengthening projects. Sector development plans should include long-term measures designed to prevent and mitigate all forms of violence against children across the sector.

How can the World Bank mainstream child SEA/H prevention into its tourism projects?

As part of its Climate Change Action Plan (2021-2025), the World Bank announced that 100% of its operations would be Paris-aligned after July 1, 2023. It explained that this “means that 100% of our operations will be vetted to manage and reduce climate risks of a project and to demonstrate that our financing supports the lower-carbon options where technically and economically feasible.” It also announced that it would produce World Bank Group Sector Notes with “guidance on how the Paris Alignment Instrument Methods (for the World Bank) and joint MDB Paris Alignment Approach (for IFC and MIGA) apply to sector-specific issues.” 

While the content of these notes at least provides transparency as to what Paris alignment means at the World Bank, they are also hugely disappointing to anyone expecting that 100% Paris-aligned meant 100% advancing the goals of the Paris Agreement. This becomes clear as soon as one reads the notes. Instead of answering the question, “how should the World Bank use its finance in this sector to contribute to the Paris Agreement goals?,” they address the question, what of our business as usual financing must we tweak to avoid promoting carbon lock-in and major risks from climate impacts to our projects?

This hugely finessed Bank definition of Paris alignment – that 'Paris alignment' is not how to advance the objectives of Paris, but only how to avoid actively undermining them – means that there is often little that will be done differently. Frequently, the sector notes only require that climate impacts be ”considered,” but do not say how they should be addressed, i.e. specifically that Bank-supported activities must contribute to low-carbon, resilient transformation. Similarly, many activities are considered Paris-aligned if they respond to climate-related harms even if they don’t address the causes. A disaster risk management project can use carbon-intensive concrete and steel, provided it reduces disaster risk. Immediate food security can be addressed without considering food supplies’ sustainability. 

This model of climate response misses the opportunity to build back better–contrary to earlier Bank promises. In line with this, the notes lack any clear commitment to mitigation: on measures that reduce emissions, the sector notes only say they “could” be done, not that they should be done. While suggesting that projects should avoid ‘carbon lock-in,’ the Bank fails to provide a basic definition for what that means, or what is required to achieve it in each sector.

How the Agriculture and Food Sector Note addresses issues is instructive. The Note describes how livestock contributes to emissions and can also lead to deforestation through clearing of land, but falls short of stating that investments in large-scale livestock production should be considered non-aligned. Similarly, when discussing crop production, the Note describes activities that can lead to land use change and deforestation, but fails to specify that these are not Paris-aligned and should be avoided. The one welcome exception to this ambiguity is the section on Integrated land management. It states clearly: “to be considered aligned, integrated land management projects should not involve expansion into areas of high carbon stocks or high biodiversity areas.” The Note could be greatly improved by stating the same for livestock, crop production, and agri-food value chain projects.

The section on Development Policy Finance (DPF) also fails to offer clear or complete direction on how AGF's DPF operations can contribute to the goals of the Paris Agreement. This should include policies on reducing food waste, increasing access to healthy foods/diets, and a shift away from livestock toward plant-based diets and alternative proteins. The Bank could apply DPF to advance this efficiently and fairly by promoting measures to apply the social cost of GHGs throughout the sector, along with social protection, technical assistance, and investment finance to support food system public goods (improving food access through local market infrastructure, nutrition awareness-raising, green technology transfer, etc.).

In sum, not using AGF Paris alignment to advance Paris Agreement goals is a huge missed opportunity, not only for climate action, but for sustainable development and food systems transformation.

Other Sector Notes similarly define Paris alignment in an expansive way that allows them to continue business as usual without making the changes necessary to actually be Paris-aligned. Each has exceptions that expand the definition of Paris-aligned in ways that are inconsistent with Paris Agreement goals. In the Energy & Extractives Sector Note, technical assistance for “an operation that will increase oil and gas production—such as in a new producing country—is not automatically non-aligned”—and the Note offers multiple open-ended circumstances where it may be considered aligned.

The Transport Sector Note is somewhat better in that it states that “risks identified should be mitigated or managed through appropriate measures for decarbonizing road transport5 such as the “Avoid-Shift-Improve” framework.” However, it also asserts that “the risk of carbon lock-in is generally low for ICE [internal combustion engine] vehicles (e.g., diesel buses),” which defies logic, given the 12 to 15-year lifespan and high emissions of diesel buses and even longer lifespans of other ICE vehicles. [See BIC’s update with recommendations for decarbonizing transport.] 

The Note for Environment, Natural Resources and Blue Economy (ENB) activities generally provides helpful guidance on how ENB activities advance Paris alignment. However, it suggests that support may be provided within ENB operations for cross-sectoral activities for which alignment definitions are weak at best– for example, the expansion of livestock production. ENB experts should be looking more critically at how these activities are considered aligned.

While the Sector Notes have many positive suggestions about what might be a lower GHG-producing or more adaptive way to undertake activities, most of these are mentioned only as options to be considered in the context of ongoing activities. They fail to state clearly what activities are misaligned. Given this, we recommend that the Notes be re-written to state clearly what activities should not be undertaken and to provide guidance to Bank teams on how to advance the Paris Agreement goals across the entire portfolio.

Be clear – It is insufficient to suggest consideration of alternatives as sufficient for Paris alignment in the context of emissions-intensive activities like production of oil and gas, industrial animal agriculture, and internal combustion engine vehicles. Support for such activities should be assigned to an exclusion list, and be clearly identified as misaligned.

Be positive (mind the gap) – The Sector Notes reflect the lowest and loosest definition of Paris alignment, “not misaligned,” in fulfilling the Bank’s initial commitment to be 100% Paris-aligned. This “double negative” approach entails reducing activities that actively run counter to Paris Agreement goals. Yet it leaves many gray areas, and fails to exclude activities and policies that may contribute to climate harm based on “productivity,” immediate needs, and other exceptions. The world needs the World Bank to be contributing positively to Paris Agreement goals, beyond the 35% that it has committed to having climate co-benefits. Being 100% Paris-aligned should ultimately mean having 100% climate co-benefits. 

Be consistent – The Sector Notes should apply across all the Bank’s financing instruments consistently and appropriately. This is especially important with respect to Development Policy Finance given that DPF is a powerful lever for change. It also is important for technical assistance, since it is often a precursor to much larger investment finance and to financial intermediary (FIs) finance, since this carries the risk of supporting FIs with much more limited commitment to Paris alignment. 

Be current – We are pleased to see the Sector Notes “will be updated periodically to reflect lessons learned, incorporate the latest evolution of technologies,” etc. Given the rapid evolution of climate change and responses to it, this is indeed important. “Periodically,” however, is hardly timebound; this commitment should be. We suggest a minimum of once in three years – consistent, for example, with the IDA replenishment timetable.

Does “Paris-aligned” Mean Advancing the goals of the Paris Agreement? Not Necessarily, Per the World Bank’s Paris Alignment Sector Notes

The World Bank released its draft Gender Strategy 2024-2030 in July, which builds off the Bank’s previous Gender Strategy (FY16-23). The Gender Strategy serves as the World Bank Group's primary framework dedicated to addressing gender disparities and advancing gender equality within its development projects and initiatives. 

To maximize the effectiveness of the gender strategy in addressing gender disparities, the Bank should focus the strategy on the areas in which the Bank has the most influence and clearest value-add, the projects it directly finances. The draft strategy focuses heavily on what has already been done in projects to advance gender equality. However, rather than using the gender strategy as an opportunity to pat itself on the back, the Bank should use the strategy to outline the actions it will take going forward to achieve gender equality. 

In 2022, BIC published a web update providing three recommendations for the new Gender Strategy: collecting and disaggregating data based on SOGIESC (sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, and sex characteristics), addressing gender-based violence (GBV) and sexual exploitation abuse and harassment (SEA/H), and including SOGIESC. The draft of the new strategy is taking strides towards making gender work more inclusive by looking at gender beyond the binary as well as the role men and boys play in gender equality. We commend the Bank for making this move. However, this more expansive approach to gender does not seem to be integrated throughout. And the strategy has also not fully addressed issues of intersectionality. Instead of using the terminology “confluence of gender and other characteristics” and other similarly vague terms, there should be a reference to the list of “disadvantaged and vulnerable groups” from the Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) to highlight which groups might be differently impacted by projects based on their gender. Overall, the strategy still does not fully address all the issues BIC identified in 2022. With that in mind, BIC has the following recommendations for the Bank to consider as it revises the draft strategy. 

Data collection, analysis, and diagnostics should go hand in hand with assessing implementation and impact.

The draft Gender Strategy has a heavy focus on using data collection and analysis to drive gender equality, yet does not specify where the capacity to collect and analyze data will come from or how data will translate into diagnostic tools. It also fails to highlight the need for data on implementation and impact evaluation to measure how projects are actually creating positive change. Our monitoring work has shown that what is in project documents does not necessarily match project implementation, so it is imperative that the strategy leads to more gender-inclusive projects on the ground. As noted in the IEG’s Evaluation of the FY16-23 Gender Strategy, staff being unable to read and analyze data is a major barrier to driving change at the project level. The draft strategy says the Bank will better integrate gender analysis in core diagnostics and assist policymakers, private sector clients, and governments to strengthen gender analysis and improve budget systems, but the strategy lacks clarity on where the capacity to do this will come from. The draft strategy should include increasing the capacity to train and hire gender experts at the country level. It should also specify an additional budget for training and capacity-building of Bank staff, especially related to intersectionality and “disadvantaged and vulnerable groups,” issues where clients often have little capacity or interest in collecting data themselves.

While there is a recognition that data on sexual and gender minorities is scarce, there is no commitment from the Bank to scale up data on sexual and gender minorities. The Bank must work with clients to increase this type of data, with the recognition that this data must be collected in a safe and secure way that doesn’t put any person’s safety at risk. This is especially important in countries that have anti-LGTBQI+ laws. However, this current dearth of data should not stop the Bank from including targeted project components addressing sexual and gender minorities in its projects. 

As BIC’s previous web update highlighted, staff capacity is imperative to tackling GBV because staff must be well-versed in reading and understanding GBV data to design appropriate measures to prevent and respond effectively. The Bank should increase focal points and Bank staff with expertise in context-specific GBV data. Alongside strengthening its internal capacity, the Bank should also strengthen client capacity to prevent and mitigate GBV.

The primary diagnostic tool the Bank utilizes in its gender work is the gender tag and flag, which generates data on gender disparities. However, it is unclear how this data is translated into changing project operations and design. The strategy states that project evaluations “can report on and assess gender outcomes in all gender-tagged/flagged operations” to inform future operations. This statement should be revised to state that future operations and evaluations “should” report on and assess outcomes in gender tagged/flagged operations to drive concrete results. Further, the mechanism of the gender tag and flag thus far has been focused on women, often detailing the number of female beneficiaries in projects. While these indicators are important, the Bank needs to emphasize how beneficiaries of projects can actually access and benefit from these projects to advance gender equality rather than focusing solely on the number of females using the metro system, for example. The Bank must also have a plan on how they will adapt the gender tag and flag to an expanded definition of gender and create the capacity for it to generate data on groups that don't currently exist, such as increasing training for staff and a corresponding increase in budget. 

2. The GBV components of the strategy should go beyond what the Bank is already doing.

In tackling GBV, the gender strategy should shift its focus to how the Bank’s own projects and programs can contribute to ending GBV. Honing in on how the Bank will end GBV in its projects will enable the Bank to focus on its value add and areas where it can have the most control. The Strategy should also look at GBV from an intersectional perspective and address, for example, the high rates of gender-based violence against LGBTQI+ people or how social exclusion or isolation can make women and girls with disabilities more vulnerable to violence. 

As a result of the Uganda Transport Sector Development Project, the Bank has made strides in addressing GBV and sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment (SEA/H) but still has a long way to go. Box 4.1 “Walking the talk: The World Bank has strong internal processes on gender equality” is framed as if the work on SEA/H is complete given that it has now included SEA/H in the ESF. While the inclusion of SEA/H in the ESF is key, it is important for the Bank to acknowledge where safeguards fall short, such as the gap between project design and implementation and staff capacity. Despite the existence of strong good practice notes on preventing SEA/H, the reality on the ground is that many Bank projects continue to contribute to SEA/H. Similarly, Box 4.1 states that IFC has leveraged its sustainability framework to address gender equity but the reality is that the IFC has financed projects that involve child sexual abuse on a massive scale, as has been reported around the Bridge International Academies investment. Ultimately, the Strategy should be forward looking and must outline a plan for how to overcome these challenges, recognizing how practice is not always in line with policy. The strategy will have the greatest impact where it highlights the concrete steps the Bank will take to strengthen its approach to GBV and SEA/H in its projects. 

The Strategy should specifically include how the Bank can build off the SEA/H reforms and explain how ending GBV and SEA/H prevention are particularly relevant for human capital and social protection projects, for example. As written, the strategy fails to make the connection between GBV and human capital, such as how combating GBV or SEA/H in the workplace can increase women’s economic empowerment, or how social protection projects can be more gender inclusive by taking a child protection lens. There should also be a focus on mainstreaming gender into the Bank’s work across all sectors. Specifically, climate change and fragility contexts are intensifying GBV, SEA/H, and violence against children (VAC). Yet, the gender strategy misses an opportunity to describe how it will interact with and relate to climate change action plans and the Bank’s FCV strategy.

3. Include sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC) throughout the strategy.

The draft gender strategy expands the scope of gender to include gender beyond the binary rather than solely focusing on women and girls, as the previous strategy did. The inclusion of sexual and gender minorities is welcome. Still, it is not incorporated throughout the strategy, and it is unclear why sexual and gender minorities are referenced in some outcomes but not all if the Bank is taking a more expansive approach to gender. For example, the Bank is still relying on the definition of gender from the 2012 World Bank Development Report on Gender and Development. Instead, it should use a more inclusive definition of gender. We propose the following definition to replace the current gender definition footnote on page 1 of the strategy: 

“Gender refers to a socially constructed set of rules, responsibilities, entitlements, and behaviors associated with being a woman, a man, or a non-binary individual. These social norms and practices are multifaceted.Their consequences differ among and within cultures, change over time, and intersect with other factors (e.g., age, class, disability, ethnicity, race, religion, citizenship, and sexual orientation). The term gender can also refer to a characteristic of a person, though it is not interchangeable with the terms sex or women. As a personal characteristic, gender includes one’s gender identity (how someone understands their own gender) and gender expression (how someone expresses their gender through appearance, behavior, names, and activities that have social meaning related to gender).” 

This definition change will set the tone for the strategy, but it cannot serve as a replacement for the inclusion of sexual and gender minorities in all outcomes throughout the document. Having this explicit reference signals to staff that gender no longer means women and girls, and they must look at the gendered impacts of all projects through an intersectional lens. Additionally, the sections “Engage Women as Leaders” and “Advance women’s participation, decision-making and leadership” need to be reframed to adequately address the Bank’s new inclusive approach.

Ultimately, we urge the Bank to scale up its capacity on gender by: allocating additional budget and staff to support making all projects gender-sensitive and enabling all to benefit, focusing on how to build in GBV and SEA/H prevention and response in all projects, and fully including sexual and gender minorities throughout all the outcomes in the final strategy.

How can the World Bank’s new Gender Strategy be strengthened?

On October 23rd, 2023, Congressional staffers, U.S. Government officials, and civil society representatives got together to celebrate the launch of the International Financial Institutions (IFI) Education Caucus. This bipartisan caucus, co-chaired by Representatives John Rutherford [FL-05-R] and Brittany Pettersen [CO-07-D], was formed to educate Members of Congress on the importance of the IFIs and how the historic leadership role of the U.S. at the institutions supports U.S. development priorities. The caucus aims to strengthen the U.S commitment to effective and informed engagement at the IFIs.

The renewed Congressional focus on the IFIs comes at a critical time. Currently, the World Bank and other MDBs plan to ramp up their lending volume and increase private sector mobilization in response to the G20 Capital Adequacy Framework. With this in mind, U.S. leadership at the institutions will be more important than ever to see to it that increased spending does not come at the cost of transparency and accountability. The IFI Education Caucus will help Members of Congress and their staffers understand the vital role Congress plays in the operations of the IFIs. 

All U.S. contributions to the various IFIs must both be authorized and appropriated by Congress. The U.S. is the lead shareholder at the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The U.S. is also the largest out-of-region shareholder in the AfDB, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EDRB). The outsized contributions of the U.S. and the reliance on Congress to form contributions means Congress is well positioned to push for better policies at the IFIs. Besides its power over appropriations, Congress can also influence the IFIs by passing voice and vote mandates and international strategies that codify the positions the U.S. representatives at the IFIs must take during negotiations and board votes. Legislation can also mandate reporting on IFI operations, and Congressional Committees can hold hearings to raise concerns over specific programs and policies. 

U.S. leadership within the IFIs has had a historically significant role in improving the IFI’s environmental and social practices. In 1989, Congress passed legislation that required executive directors that represent the U.S. at the World Bank and all regional multilateral development banks (MDBs) to vote against MDB projects that lack appropriate environmental assessments or if the assessments have not been disclosed to the public 120 days before the vote. This piece of legislation, colloquially known as the Pelosi Amendment, pushed all the major MDBs to implement environmental and disclosure practices to ensure they retained the support of the U.S. Similarly, in 1993, Congress tied financial support for the International Development Association’s (IDA) 10th replenishment to the creation of the Inspection Panel, the first independent accountability mechanism (IAM) of its kind. The Inspection Panel was formed the same year, and today, nearly all other MDBs have IAMs.

U.S. leadership has played an important role in pushing the IFIs to be more transparent, accountable, and environmentally and socially sustainable, but there is more to be done. The World Bank’s Paris Alignment methodology still suffers from gaps that compromise the Bank’s environmental performance, and the private sector lending arm of the World Bank still greatly struggles to provide remedy to project-affected communities. The Inter-American Development Bank’s (IDB) access to information policy is rife with ambiguities, and the African Development Bank’s (ADB) Integrated Safeguard System has enduring issues with implementation. The launch of the IFI Caucus provides an opportunity for Congress to strengthen U.S. leadership and address these challenges. We welcome the launch of the Caucus and look forward to future engagement.

The Bank Information Center welcomes the launch of the IFI Education Caucus

Last June, the IDB Group opened a consultation process to seek input on their new institutional strategy. This document will set the strategic direction of the IDB Group as it works to support sustainable development in the region. The strategy will be approved at the next IDB Annual Meeting in 2024 and is expected to apply until 2030. 

BIC and partner members of the IDB Working Group, a group of multiple regional and international organizations focusing on advocacy targeting the IDB, sent a letter to President Goldfajn highlighting concerns regarding the consultation process and urging the IDB Group to improve its quality. As the IDB Group reviews its strategic plan, it will be important for them to develop strong and robust institutional channels so that CSOs and project-affected groups can better engage with different levels of IDB management when needed. 

BIC and the IDB Working Group provided extensive comments and recommendations for the IDB Group to consider as it develops its institutional strategy. You can read them in their entirety here.

In our comments, we point out that scaling-up and accelerating investments without considering the context and experience of affected communities is deeply concerning. It must be clear in the IDB Group's institutional strategy that this growth, increase in additional risks, and further collaboration with the private sector should not come at the expense of the most marginalized groups. For the most marginalized communities to be left to carry that additional risk is contrary to the IDB’s Group development mandate and will undermine its efforts to address the climate crisis and other regional challenges. The new strategy must put people at the center and be informed by the communities or local populations that are supposed to benefit from IDB projects and operations. 

In this vein, as the IDB aims to scale up its investments and play a catalyzing role in regional sustainable development, it is critical that the IDB Group prioritize quality investments. An increase in risk requires a proportional increase in monitoring and supervision of compliance with social and environmental safeguards, something the IDB Group lacks the capacity to do. The IDB can improve the quality of its financing by doubling down on principles of good governance—especially transparency, access to information, and accountability. 

Also, the IDB needs to improve upstream planning, which is essential for the design and implementation of robust projects with maximum potential for achieving sustainable development goals. Improved upstream planning is critical for the identification of the “right” projects that promote social and environmental sustainability throughout the project cycle, from policy to planning to implementation.

In addition, if the IDB wants to be a ‘climate bank’ it needs to improve the IDB’s approach toward Paris-alignment and the 2030 Agenda. A focus on alignment with client country commitments is insufficient to meet the 1.5 degree target, as few of the country plans do so. Instead, the Bank needs to identify ways to play an additive role, going beyond aggregate country commitments to meet Paris's goals. 

Finally, the IDB Group needs to rethink the way in which it engages with civil society and project-impacted communities. Spaces for such engagement are often poorly designed and implemented, proving insufficient and ineffective to adequately receive the perspectives of communities and civil society. We encourage the IDB Group to foster an institutional culture which recognizes that the best way to deliver positive development outcomes is through learning from mistakes and being open to engaging in constructive and effective relationships with civil society and project-affected communities. 

It is critical that the IDB Group not only evolve its mission and financing to meet regional challenges, but that it works to improve its operating model, safeguards application, upstream planning, and relationship with civil society and project-affected communities. 

Read the full document with recommendations in Spanish here and English here.

How can the IDB develop a new Institutional Strategy that prioritizes people and the planet?

The African Development Bank (AfDB)’s first Integrated Safeguards System (ISS) was approved in 2013, becoming operational in 2014. Following an evaluation by the AfDB’s Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV) group in 2019, the ISS underwent a review involving internal and external consultations in 2021 and 2022. 

The updated ISS, approved by AfDB’s Board of Directors in April, is expected to go into effect in 2024. The new policy makes forward progress on a number of environmental and social issues, including on the priorities that civil society raised with the AfDB through the consultation process. 

The policy commits to “zero tolerance for reprisals, sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment (SEA/H), gender based violence (GBV), or discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity.”

The environmental and social assessment policy (OS1) directs Borrowers to consider direct, indirect, contextual, and cumulative project-specific risks and impacts, and requires an assessment of vulnerability to climate change.

The policy includes specific definitions and requirements to promote the inclusion of, and prevent harm to, “vulnerable groups” as well as Indigenous People and “highly vulnerable rural minorities.”

OS4 on Community, Health, Safety, and Security includes positive language around climate change and the provision of universal access in new construction to enable everyone, including persons with disabilities, to use the new structures, though it stops short of recognizing the increased vulnerability of persons with disabilities to climate change. Instead, it only highlights persons with disabilities a group to consider with risks related to community health or an influx of project workers. 

The policy includes requirements to disclose project grievance mechanisms and the Independent Recourse Mechanism (IRM) to affected communities, including for Financial Intermediary projects.

The policy requires risk assessment, mitigation, and response to the risks of SEA/H, GBV, child labor, or modern slavery when identified and/or a related complaint has been filed/registered.

The policy includes a standalone safeguard on stakeholder engagement and information disclosure (OS10) which requires Borrowers to develop stakeholder engagement plans to facilitate engagement and information sharing throughout the project cycle.

However, significant recommendations from civil society were not taken on board. One such recommendation was that there should be a separate and standalone safeguard policy for Indigenous People or “highly vulnerable rural minorities,” rather than an umbrella policy on Vulnerable Groups, due to the specific and differentiated requirements for projects impacting Indigenous People. The ISS also misses an opportunity to reduce climate pollution by failing to directly exclude  activities that contribute significantly to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in its Environmental and Social Exclusion List (OS1 Annex 3).

Based on BIC and partners’ experiences monitoring projects including the East African Coastal Corridor Development Project in Kenya, where project implementers lacked adequate knowledge of ISS requirements, civil society also remains concerned that advances in the updated ISS will not be implemented. Our experience has shown the AfDB to be slow to respond to civil society’s concerns, reluctant to address Borrowers’ noncompliance with the requirements of the 2013 ISS, and unwilling to dedicate the resources (human and financial) to provide the level of monitoring and supervision necessary to prevent noncompliance with the existing standards. The new requirements add to the need for expertise and load of due diligence, capacity building, and supervision. With this in mind, the AfDB must make a significant shift and demonstrate strong commitment to full implementation and resourcing of the new ISS, from the top levels of management to the direct engagement with project implementers. This is especially important for areas in which the AfDB will need to build its own expertise and capacity in order to meet new requirements, including disability rights, LGBTQI+ inclusion, and the prevention of reprisals and SEA/H.

As the AfDB moves toward implementation of the updated ISS: 

Consultation is important on supplemental guidance and requirements to be developed by the AfDB, including all Guidance Notes and planned staff Directives on sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI), reprisals, and SEA/H/GBV. All of these supporting documents should also be made public once finalized. Civil society have submitted input on the draft Guidance Notes and hope to see that input taken into consideration in final guidance.

It is imperative that there be robust training for Borrowers and AfDB staff on the new ISS, paying particular attention to new areas around social inclusion, SEA/H, and climate change assessment, among others.

The AfDB must strengthen its supervision role so that project documents and implementation are in line with the requirements of the new ISS.

The AfDB must publish a detailed timeline and action plan for training and rollout of the new ISS.

The Board must approve adequate resources and capacity improvements for implementing the new ISS requirements. The updated ISS represents a significant progression for the AfDB in terms of necessary due diligence, Borrower support, and supervision requirements. However, broadening the scope of the ISS in order to incorporate additional social issues, including ones that impact children, will require the development of new staff capacity, expertise, and training for existing staff at both headquarters and country offices. Without additional resources, any advances in the new policy will not be realized at the project level, perpetuating dangerous compliance gaps.

The AfDB should be more open and responsive to civil society and communities who  raise issues during the implementation of the updated ISS.

The AfDB has approved new safeguards, but is it ready to implement them?

The World Bank is developing an evolution roadmap, designed to enable the institution to increase its lending to address the climate crisis, and crisis preparedness more broadly. This initiative came about as a result of pressure from shareholders around the need for the MDB system to evolve to better meet global challenges.

Last October, several World Bank shareholders, including the US and Germany, called on the Bank to produce a roadmap by the end of the year on how it can evolve to respond to the multiple crises the world currently faces, including climate change. In response to this call, the Bank produced its Evolution Roadmap, laying out their strategy to address these challenges moving forward. The Bank opened up a consultation window for civil society to provide their thoughts on the Bank’s new plan, with July 31st being the due date for submission. 

BIC took the opportunity to provide extensive comments on the Bank’s proposed roadmap, which you can read in their entirety here.

BIC’S comments honed in on the fact that, notably, the Evolution Roadmap makes no mention of the communities that host World Bank Group projects and investments and the people that are meant to benefit from such development projects. BIC and other civil society partners have pointed out that WBG projects far too often fail to adhere to Environmental & Social requirements, in some cases leaving communities facing negative impacts even after the WBG has exited or closed the project. Taking into account the Bank’s track record of failing to remedy harm that results from its projects, a massive scaling-up and acceleration of WBG investments without consideration of the circumstances of and impacts to affected communities is deeply concerning. 

While we welcome the ambition to position the WBG as a leader in mobilizing financing to address global challenges, including through taking on additional risk, it is contrary to the WBG’s development mandate for the poorest and most marginalized communities to be left to carry that additional risk. Allowing that to happen will undermine its efforts to address the climate crisis and other global challenges.

BIC also provided comments on the Bank’s Corporate Scorecard. We strongly support an overhaul of the scorecard so that it is focused on outcomes and not on money spent. The purpose of the Corporate Scorecard should be to report out to stakeholders and shareholders on the Bank’s development impact. It is BIC’s opinion that, with respect to the process of developing and utilizing the corporate scorecard, the World Bank Group (WBG) should proactively share information and seek the views of external stakeholders, including those who are directly affected by the Bank’s work, through consultation. Any changes to the scorecard, including currently in the context of the Evolution Roadmap, should involve consultations with stakeholders. Ideally, the WBG would produce an updated scorecard annually, or at the very least publish some indicators annually where feasible. 

It is critical that the World Bank not only evolve its mission and financing to meet global challenges, but that it works to improve its operating model, safeguards application, and approach to remedy in order to truly put project affected populations at the center of its work.

How can the World Bank improve its evolution roadmap?

On Wednesday, May 3, 2023, the Executive Directors of the World Bank President selected Ajay Banga as the next President of the World Bank, his term beginning on June 2, 2023. Mr. Banga assumes the role amid compounding global crises, including heightened global conflict, growing economic uncertainty and debt, and accelerating impacts of climate change. We encourage Mr. Banga to recognize this critical opportunity to promote sustainability, inclusion, and accountability at the institution. 

Mr. Banga will join the Bank as the institution transforms its mission and purpose as part of an effort to evolve the MDB system, an initiative spearheaded by U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen. At the end of 2022, the Bank released its Evolution Roadmap, detailing a plan to reshape its mission and scale up financing to address the growing global challenges of climate change, pandemic preparedness, and fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV). From his first day leading the Bank, Mr. Banga must demonstrate vision and leadership on how the Bank will implement, operationalize, and integrate this initiative with its twin goals of reducing poverty and promoting shared prosperity by fostering sustainable, resilient, and inclusive development.

At the same time as the Bank seeks to evolve its mission, it continues to fund projects and policies supporting fossil fuels, as well as forest-destroying livestock and infrastructure projects. We call on Mr. Banga to lead the Bank in responding to the urgency of the climate crisis with clear, transparent climate actions that meet the Bank’s commitment to align its entire portfolio with the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement.

Finally, Mr. Banga must do more than articulate a clear vision of the World Bank Group’s development mission. As President of the World Bank, we expect Mr. Banga to commit to implementing that vision throughout all Bank-funded activities based on the following principles:

Community-driven: Projects should be selected and designed in partnership with communities, and the institution should prioritize accountability to these stakeholders.

Equitable: Project benefits should be equitably shared, and the negative impacts of projects must not disproportionately affect the poorest and most marginalized communities.

Sustainable: All activities must be fiscally, socially, and environmentally sustainable to benefit current and future generations.

Human rights-focused: The promotion and protection of human rights should be a key purpose and guiding principle of the institution.

Transparent: The Bank should promote transparency and accountability in all its projects and policies and provide inclusive and meaningful opportunities for civil society and communities to engage with the institution on its practices and policies.

Inclusive: Projects and programs should be designed and implemented to address the needs of marginalized groups, enabling all to benefit and not be harmed.

These principles should inform all Bank policies and projects, and we expect Mr. Banga to articulate a vision for how to incorporate them into the institution’s work meaningfully. 

Since his nomination by President Biden to lead the World Bank, Mr. Banga has spoken about his vision for the Bank, often stating that the Bank needs to be willing to take risks to accelerate the rate of development. While we don't oppose risk-taking, it is critical that the burden of that risk not fall on the poorest and most vulnerable. Therefore, we expect Mr. Banga to pair this rhetoric with a commitment to strong safeguards, performance standard implementation, and a clear plan for providing remedy to communities when projects cause harm. 

BIC recognizes the deep knowledge of global markets and significant experience in the financial sector that Mr. Banga brings to the position. Further, we appreciate his stated commitment to promoting economic inclusion and shared prosperity. However, Mr. Banga’s success will be determined by how he translates this background into a development context and if he promotes inclusion, accountability, and sustainability not only through rhetoric but  in all Bank projects, programs and policies. At this critical time, the World Bank needs a President who will take a transparent, community-centered approach, while promoting civic engagement and the role of civil society. We look forward to working with Mr. Banga on these critical issues.

BIC Welcomes New World Bank President, Ajay Banga

On Wednesday, February 15, 2023, World Bank President David Malpass announced he would step down from his position at the end of June 2023, about a year before his term ends. Mr. Malpass has led the Bank over the last four years amid compounding crises, including the global pandemic, economic downturn, and accelerating impacts of climate change.

The next World Bank President will assume the role as the institution transforms its mission and purpose as part of an effort to evolve the MDB system, an initiative spearheaded by U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen. At the end of 2022, the World Bank released its Evolution Roadmap, detailing a plan to reshape its mission and scale up financing to address growing global challenges.

The members of the IFI Working Group have described expectations for the next World Bank President and reacted to the announcement:

Bank Information Center: Statement on the Resignation of World Bank President David Malpass

Center for Global Development: What the Biden Administration Should Be Looking for in a World Bank President

The ONE Campaign: Tweet from ONE’s President Tom Hart

E3G: Tweet from Public Banks Program Leader, Sonia Dunlop

Oxfam: World Bank "evolution" test will be hiring process of new President: Oxfam

The IFI Working Group Reacts to the Resignation of World Bank President David Malpass

In recent weeks, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 omnibus spending bill became law, and the Biden-Harris Administration released its Fiscal Year 2023 President’s Budget Request (FY23 PBR), which now goes to Congress for consideration. The FY22 omnibus spending bill provided meager support for climate finance and failed to authorize the Asian Development Fund (AsDF) or pay down arrears to the International Development Association (IDA). However, BIC commends the administration for showing greater ambition in the FY23 PBR. It is crucial that the administration works with Congress to pass the FY23 PBR before the midterm elections. Increased political uncertainty after November 2022 may jeopardize the ability of the U.S. to raise its climate commitments and fulfill its pledge to the multilateral development banks (MDBs), damaging U.S. credibility at the institutions and with international partners. 

BIC’s key takeaways and recommendations from the FY22 omnibus spending bill and FY23 PBR include:

Green Climate Fund: Congress failed to support the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in the FY22 omnibus spending bill, a disappointing outcome representing a broken promise to the international community. While the FY23 PBR includes $1.6 billion for the GCF, this is not enough funding for the U.S. to meet its Obama-era pledge of $3 billion. The missing U.S. GCF contribution underscores the longstanding failure of wealthy countries to appropriate adequate levels of climate finance. Still, the U.S. can work to close this gap by utilizing its leadership role at the MDBs to push the institutions to meet their climate commitments. 


International Development Association: Due to COVID-19, IDA, the World Bank’s window for low-income countries, frontloaded funding from IDA19 to address the crisis and began the IDA20 replenishment process a year early to secure the necessary support to continue providing high levels of financing to the world’s poorest countries. The accelerated replenishment requires the U.S. to contribute an unprecedented level of funding this year toward the final year of IDA19 and the first year of IDA20. BIC is pleased that the FY22 omnibus spending bill includes total funding of $1.01 billion for the final year of the IDA19 replenishment. Further, the FY23 PBR includes $1.43 billion for IDA20 and details a plan for the U.S. to backload the remaining funding for IDA20 over the last two years, FY24 and FY25. Fulfilling its pledge to IDA is key for the U.S. to maintain its ability to push the World Bank to improve its environmental, social, and accountability standards. 

However, despite the administration's welcome inclusion of a strategy to meet its IDA20 pledge, we are concerned that backloading contributions risks adding more outstanding U.S. arrears to the institution, which were not paid down in either the FY22 omnibus spending bill or the FY23 PBR. Typically, pledges are appropriated equally over three years. The administration’s IDA20 funding strategy will require Congress to increase contributions to IDA over the next two years, which may be politically difficult after the midterm elections. We encourage the U.S. Treasury Department to communicate its IDA20 funding strategy and the importance of the U.S. fulfilling its IDA pledge to Capitol Hill and civil society stakeholders, emphasizing the need to preserve the unique leadership role of the U.S at the institution. 

Asian Development Fund: The FY22 omnibus spending bill failed to secure authorization for the U.S. contribution towards the Asian Development Fund’s (AsDF) twelfth replenishment (AsDF-13). The failure of Congress to authorize AsDF-13 will impact the credibility and leadership role of the U.S. during policy negotiations, such as the ongoing Asian Development Bank (ADB) Safeguard Policy Review. However, the FY23 PBR seeks to correct this oversight and requests authorization for the AsDF-13 replenishment. We encourage Congress to meet this request, passing the necessary authorization to allow the institution to receive the $43.6 million appropriated in the FY22 omnibus spending bill for the first installment of the AsDF-13 replenishment. Further, passing replenishment authorizations is an opportunity for Congress to push the IFIs to improve their practices and policies. When authorizing AsDF-13, Congress should call on the ADB to meet the highest international standards in developing their new safeguard policies. 

BIC encourages the administration and Capitol Hill to recognize the unique role of the U.S. at the MDBs in improving these institutions’ policies and practices. While BIC is disappointed that Congress failed to fund the GCF in the FY22 omnibus spending bill, the U.S. should seek to mitigate this by utilizing its leadership role at the MDBs to push these institutions to meet their climate commitments. However, for the U.S. to maintain its influence at the MDBs, Congress must appropriate enough funding to fulfill U.S. pledges, pay down arrears, and authorize new replenishments. 

What are the implications of Congressional Appropriations for U.S. leadership at the MDBs?

Nearly one year after the military seized control of the Burmese government from the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) party in a coup, the nation is still in turmoil, and the junta remains in power. Many members of the civilian government have been detained since February 1, 2021, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyia, Burma’s former leader, cabinet ministers, NLD party members, activists, and journalists. As a result, there have been mass protests for months. An estimated 1,300 people have been killed, including children, and more than 10,000 jailed. Under the military regime, civic space is severely restricted, and journalists and protesters are regularly attacked, arrested, and tortured by the armed forces. 

Prior to the 2021 coup, the international financial institutions (IFIs), including the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), had robust lending programs in Burma. However, shortly after the civilian government fell, all three institutions put a temporary hold on project disbursements. However, there is credible evidence that the World Bank has continued to send disbursements to Burma as recently as January 2022.

The IFIs must maintain a moratorium on direct lending and disbursements to Burma while the military junta remains in power. Not only is the junta undemocratically elected and committing violence against civilians, but it also blocks international humanitarian aid from reaching those in need. For instance, days before the coup in 2021, the IMF disbursed $372.39 million to the Central Bank of Myanmar to support marginalized communities during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, in September 2021, the IMF stated that it could not confirm if these funds were used as intended.

In response to the junta, the United States House of Representatives passed a bipartisan amendment, Sec. 6104, to the Fiscal Year 2022’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that ends U.S. support of multilateral assistance for Burma through its current military regime. This amendment was offered by Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-CA), Chairwoman of the House Financial Services Committee, which has jurisdiction over U.S. participation in IFIs. It was cosponsored by Congresswoman Ann Wagner (R-MO) and received broad support in the House. Specifically, this amendment states that the United States will not recognize the Burmese military junta as the official government of Burma for the purpose of providing assistance from the IFIs. The amendment directs the Secretary of Treasury to instruct the United States Executive Director at the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and International Monetary Fund to notify the respective institution that it is the policy of the U.S. government to oppose, and use the voice and vote of the United States against any assistance to Burma through the State Administrative Council, or any entity controlled by the military. Finally, the amendment contains a critical exception for humanitarian aid channeled through an independent implementing agency, such as a United Nations body, enabling the people of Burma to continue to receive needed aid without providing fiscal support to the junta. 

We encourage the IFIs to adopt a similar policy internally and commit to not directly lending to Burma while there are no democratic elections and the military remains in power. As one of the largest shareholders at the IFIs, the U.S. should use its power and influence to gain support from other donors and pressure the IFIs to refuse to compromise development aid in Burma by working with the junta, including on COVID-19 response projects. Any IFI support made to the military-controlled government would undermine U.S. and international efforts to pressure the junta to respect the Burmese people's rights and restore democracy to the country. 

We appreciate the efforts of the U.S. Congress, and in particular the longstanding leadership of Chairwoman Waters, to condemn this regime and would like to see the passage of the NDAA Sec. 6104 amendment complemented by action at the IFIs. Considering the widespread evidence of the military junta’s serious human rights violations, it is critical that the IFIs adopt an official policy, along the lines of that contained in the NDAA, to halt lending obligations and suspend disbursements, pending grants, and loans to the military junta-controlled Burma. The international community, and the IFIs, must stand in solidarity with the Burmese people by refusing to legitimize the coup and denouncing military violence at this critical moment. 

NDAA amendment ends U.S. support to military-controlled Burma through the IFIs: Should the IFIs adopt a similar policy?

In late 2020, the IDB Invest approved a $20.25 million loan for the Jilamito Hydroelectric Project in Honduras with support from the U.S. Executive Director. At the time the United States’ own development finance institution, the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), was also considering supporting the project with a $35.7 million loan. However, in May 2021, the DFC withdrew its support for the project, reportedly over human rights concerns after an extensive due diligence process. The continued participation of the U.S. in this project through its position at the IDB Invest is an overt contradiction. BIC has documented instances where DFC policy falls short of what the U.S. requires of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), but in this case, the U.S. actually endorsed a project at an MDB that its own institution saw as too problematic. This demonstrates glaring policy inconsistencies between the DFC and U.S. posture at the MDBs, weakening U.S. credibility across the development landscape. 

Over the last few years, communities and activists have protested the project, with at least two people killed in retaliation for these activities. The IDB Invest project’s sponsor, Hermacasa S.A., controlled by Emin J. Abufele and Massachusetts-based Simonds International, is tied to the corrupt government of Honduras and the violence against activists. While community activists applaud the DFC’s decision to withdraw from the project, they continue to protest the IDB Invest’s support. 

Part of IDB Invest’s due diligence process was the institution’s response to a letter from Honduran groups and project-affected communities. In the letter, the IDB Invest states that the project has an approved environmental license to operate and was approved by the community in a town hall held in the Municipality of Arizona in 2015. However, local stakeholders contest the legitimacy of this environmental license due to irregularities [1] and the legitimacy of the town hall because community members allege that the Mayor paid the attendees for their support. [2] 

The IDB Invest is largely opaque about how the client engaged with project-affected communities, particularly those who opposed the project, prior to project approval as well as how it verifies information received from the client, including the client’s ability to effectively apply the IDB’s Performance Standards. To this point, the U.S. has not done enough to encourage the IDB to investigate and address the issues raised by the communities.

How can the U.S. better coordinate and strengthen its international development strategy at the MDBs and the DFC? 

In the coming months, the United Nations will host dialogues between project-affected communities and the project sponsor, Hermacasa S.A. While the IDB Invest will participate as an observer, the DFC will not join these conversations, which sends a strong message that the United States’ own development bank categorically rejects the Jilamito Project and will not legitimize its existence. 

The United States’ continued support for the Jilamito Project at the IDB Invest damages U.S. credibility with international partners and communities. We urge the administration and Congress to consider the following recommendations:   

The U.S. should publicly disavow its support for the Jilamito project at the IDB Invest and call the IDB Invest to divest from the project. In the letter to Secretary Yellen, project-affected communities explain why people on the ground want the IDB Invest to divest from the project. They also show the social, contextual, and institutional complexities that were not addressed during the IDB Invest’s due diligence process. Also, there are several concerns about the sponsor’s failure to respond and address concerns from communities on the ground. The U.S. should push the IDB Invest to protect the rights of communities affected by the Jilamito project to avoid further harm. 


The Senate should work to swiftly confirm the CEO of the DFC, as well as the nominees for the U.S. Executive Director positions at the MDBs. Congress should then begin working with these officials on a coordinated U.S. approach to development finance policy that works towards upward harmonization of safeguards policies. Ideally, the U.S. would then support a more consistent standard of social and environmental policies across the MDBs and the DFC. In cases where there is a legitimate reason why the U.S. has differing positions between institutions, there should be transparency around the rationale.


The DFC should cooperate with Treasury’s Office of Development Results and Accountability (ODRA). ODRA works closely with U.S. representatives at the MDBs to determine voting positions on projects based on U.S. environmental and social standards at the MDBs. We encourage the DFC to follow this model and coordinate with ODRA to achieve greater policy consistency between the MDBs and the DFC. Further, we recommend that if the U.S. decides not to support a project through any development finance institution, it should refrain from supporting that same project at a different institution. This would result in a more unified development strategy, and eliminate the current patchwork of support for development finance projects, as seen with the Jilamito Project. 

BIC encourages the U.S. Government to learn from its experience with the Jilamito Hydroelectric Project and work to better align its policies and practices across the development finance landscape, particularly between the DFC and U.S. engagement at the MDBs. Creating a more coherent development strategy is crucial not only to strengthen the credibility of the U.S. at the MDBs and with the international community, but to achieve more inclusive and sustainable development outcomes. 

For more information on BIC’s advocacy, subscribe to our newsletter.

[1] See the letter sent by project-affected communities to Secretary Yellen, April 2021.

[2] See letter to Secretary Yellen, April 2021 for details.

The Jilamito Hydroelectric Project: How can the U.S. better protect the rights of project-affected communities?

The International Development Association (IDA) is the arm of the World Bank that provides grants and below-market loans to the world’s 74 poorest countries. In April 2021, IDA took the unprecedented step of accelerating its twentieth replenishment (IDA20) by one year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, announcing “Building Back Better from the Crisis: Towards a Green, Resilient and Inclusive Future,'' as the overarching theme. That same month, following IDA’s announcement, officials from donor governments, Deputies, met to discuss the status of commitments from IDA’s last replenishment and special themes and cross-cutting issues for IDA20. 

In June 2021, IDA Deputies met again to hear the Bank’s financing framework and policy commitments for the twentieth replenishment. Ahead of these meetings, BIC provided key recommendations for the IDA20 policy package, pushing for increased ambition on disability and inclusion, climate, and preventing sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). After discussing IDA’s policy papers on each special theme and cross-cutting issue, Deputies also overwhelmingly encouraged management to set higher IDA20 policy goals. As a result, IDA fine-tuned its commitments to include an enhanced focus on nutrition and sexual and reproductive health and increased incentives for vaccine financing. 

While BIC appreciates these developments in the IDA20 policy package, we encourage IDA to raise the ambition of its commitments during the October 20-22, 2021 meetings. As one of the largest shareholders, the United States has the opportunity to lead IDA and other donors to set higher IDA20 objectives, underscoring the impacts of COVID-19 and climate change on marginalized groups. During the final pledging session in December 2021, it will be critical that the U.S. makes a robust pledge to IDA20 to enable it to lead on its policy objectives. Therefore, ahead of the October and December IDA Deputies meetings, BIC encourages the U.S. to advocate for the following policies:

IDA should seek stronger commitments on disability: Disability was a cross-cutting issue in IDA19 and a priority for the U.S. Under IDA20, World Bank management announced that human capital would become a special theme, encompassing health, education, social safety nets, and disability. We are concerned that the commitments on disability within this theme lack ambition. For example, IDA commits to supporting at least eighteen IDA countries to meet the needs of persons with disabilities by implementing the principles of universal access through projects in education, health, social protection, water, urban, digital development and/or transport. However, IDA projects are already required to meet these standards under the Bank’s Environmental and Social Framework (ESF). At a minimum, IDA should significantly increase the number of countries it commits to supporting under this objective. Further, we encourage IDA to increase the ambition within all its human capital commitments to better consider persons with disability and inclusion. For instance, Policy Commitment 2, which focuses on maternal and reproductive health, should also address access to these services for persons with disabilities. As a strong advocate for disability rights, we encourage the U.S. to use its position as one of the largest donors to build support among shareholders and push management to consider disability within the human capital theme more ambitiously. 

The IDA20 nature-based solutions policy commitments should feature the critical role of indigenous communities as ecosystem stewards prominently: We support the prioritization of nature-based solutions under the IDA20 climate change special theme, recognizing the benefits these policies and projects have both in reducing GHG emissions and increasing resilience to climate impacts. However, we encourage IDA to better integrate forests and forest peoples throughout its climate commitments, as the importance of engaging with indigenous communities is only featured under Lessons Learned. Historically, nature-based solutions have received little dedicated climate financing, despite the significant value forests and natural ecosystems have in contributing to human well-being and climate stabilization, such as absorbing and storing carbon above and below ground and regulating rainfall. Further, when indigenous communities and forest peoples manage these ecosystems, there is a lower rate of deforestation, and landscapes are more biodiverse, store more carbon, and benefit more people. The October IDA20 meetings are an important opportunity for the U.S. and other donors to push IDA to prioritize the essential role indigenous communities and forest peoples play in implementing and realizing the full potential of nature-based solutions. 

Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), especially of children, is not sufficiently prioritized within the human capital, fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV), and gender and development themes: There is an inherent risk of SEA in all types of projects funded by IDA. Further, the global economic downturn caused by COVID-19, which is still at its height in many developing countries, has led to significant negative impacts for women and children, especially those out of school, including an increase in SEA. SEA is particularly acute in FCV contexts. However, there are no SEA commitments within the FCV theme, nor is SEA addressed within the human capital theme. Further, the short discussion of SEA in the gender and development paper does not specifically focus on risks posed to children, including boys. These omissions are missed opportunities for IDA to address the unique risks of child SEA that arise from IDA projects. Preventing child SEA and protecting children enables them to complete their education and represents a significant investment in human capital. IDA Deputies should encourage the Bank to include preventing child SEA indicators within the human capital, FCV, and gender and development objectives.

Stakeholder Engagement should be emphasized across IDA’s special themes: While we appreciate that the IDA20 climate change paper stressed the importance of stakeholder engagement with indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities, we would like to see greater recognition of the integral role that engagement with all affected communities plays across special themes. For instance, effective stakeholder engagement is essential to delivering on IDA20’s human capital objectives. However, while Objective 3 under the human capital theme focuses on the importance of stakeholder engagement in addressing social service gaps caused by COVID-19, stakeholder engagement is not sufficiently considered in other policy commitments and objectives under this theme. Finally, stakeholder engagement is not mentioned under the crisis preparedness and governance and institutions cross-cutting issues, which is a missed opportunity.

An accelerated IDA20 replenishment is unprecedented and reflects the level of need and depth of the crises the world is facing. While we commend IDA’s growing ambition for the twentieth replenishment policy package, we encourage IDA to show greater ambition within the disability, climate, and SEA commitments, and in mainstreaming stakeholder engagement. As a long time champion for reform and progress at the World Bank and IDA, the U.S. should make a robust pledge and use its unique leadership position to advocate for more ambitious, inclusive, and green policy commitments from the IDA20 replenishment process.

What should the U.S. prioritize in the final months of IDA20 replenishment negotiations?

The International Development Association (IDA) is the arm of the World Bank that provides grants and below-market loans to the world’s 74 poorest countries. IDA operates on a cash-in, cash-out basis and relies on grants from donor countries for about 30 percent of its funding, raising most funds through capital markets. Contributions from donors are critical for IDA to continue operations and maintain its credibility in capital markets to leverage new resources and convert market borrowing to grants. Every three years, donors meet to replenish IDA’s funds and review its policies. The last IDA replenishment, IDA19, began on July 1, 2020, to fund IDA through June 30, 2023. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, IDA front-loaded its third-year funds to address the crisis and cannot maintain current lending levels to member countries without supplemental funding from shareholders. To address this dilemma, IDA announced it would accelerate the next replenishment by one year. The IDA20 replenishment began in April 2021, when IDA Deputies met to discuss the status of IDA19 commitments and special themes and cross-cutting issues for IDA20. 

At the next meeting of IDA Deputies on June 23-24, 2021, IDA will present the financing framework and policy commitments for IDA20. The June meetings are a key moment for donors to advocate for policy reforms and seek greater ambition from the Bank. As one of the three largest IDA shareholders, these meetings will be a pivotal moment for the United States to push IDA to raise the ambition of its commitments. Further, due to domestic budget constraints, the United Kingdom will step back as IDA’s largest donor, creating an entry point for the U.S. to assume a more prominent leadership role during IDA20 negotiations.

In April, IDA announced the overarching theme of IDA20 is “Building Back Better from the Crisis: Towards a Green, Resilient and Inclusive Future,'' and the special themes are climate change, fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV), jobs and economic transformation, and human capital. Focusing on expanding recovery efforts, the four cross-cutting issues are crisis preparedness, debt sustainability and transparency, governance and institutions, and technology. Together, these guiding themes shape IDA’s policy priorities for the twentieth replenishment and signal IDA’s desire to help low-income countries respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and support a green and equitable recovery. The pandemic’s social and economic impacts have reversed decades of development progress in IDA member countries. Therefore, it is crucial that IDA sets ambitious targets during IDA20 negotiations to help its member countries regain lost ground, prevent further back-sliding, and address the other looming crisis — climate change. 

During the IDA-20 replenishment negotiations, BIC encourages the U.S. to advocate for the following policies:

Disability should remain a key priority: Disability was a cross-cutting issue in IDA19 and a priority for the U.S. Under IDA20, World Bank management announced that human capital would become a special theme, encompassing health, education, social safety nets, and disability. We are concerned that the elimination of disability as a specific cross-cutting issue and its inclusion under the broader human capital theme will deprioritize disability issues. As a strong advocate for disability rights, we encourage the U.S. to use its position as one of the largest donors to build support among shareholders and push management to consider disability within each theme ambitiously. IDA deputies should systematically consider disability rights during IDA20 negotiations to support the needs and rights of persons with disabilities and provide them full access to project benefits. 


Nature-based solutions should feature prominently in the IDA20 policy commitments on climate: Under the Biden administration, the U.S. renewed its commitment to climate action. In April, the administration released the U.S. International Climate Finance Plan, directing the U.S. Department of Treasury and the U.S. Executive Directors in multilateral development banks (MDBs) to push the MDBs to set and apply ambitious climate finance targets and policies, in partnership with other shareholders. We encourage the U.S. to prioritize nature-based solutions in its climate policies and advocate measures that integrate forests and forest peoples, who serve as effective ecosystem stewards, into the IDA20 policy commitments. Historically, nature-based solutions have received little dedicated climate financing, despite the significant value forests and natural ecosystems have in contributing to human well-being and  climate stabilization — for example, by absorbing and storing carbon above and below ground and by regulating rainfall. The IDA20 climate change special theme is an important opportunity for the U.S., other donors, and IDA to prioritize nature-based solutions and recognize the benefits these policies and projects have both in reducing GHG emissions and increasing resilience to climate impacts.


Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), especially of children, should be prioritized within the human capital and FCV themes: There is an inherent risk of SEA in all types of projects funded by IDA and the World Bank, particularly infrastructure, education and fast-tracked COVID-19 response projects. Further, the global economic downturn caused by COVID-19, which is still at its height in many developing countries, has led to significant negative impacts for women and children, especially those out of school, including an increase in SEA. This risk is particularly acute in FCV contexts, and thus SEA should be specifically addressed in this theme. IDA policy commitments around SEA should also require measures to address the unique risks of child SEA that arise from IDA projects. Preventing child SEA and protecting children enables them to complete their education and represents a significant investment in human capital. IDA deputies should encourage the Bank to prioritize preventing SEA in IDA20 as part of a resilient and inclusive recovery from the COVID pandemic. 

An accelerated IDA20 replenishment is unprecedented and reflects the level of need and depth of the crises the world is facing. As a historical champion for reform and progress at the World Bank and IDA, the U.S. should use its unique leadership position to advocate for more ambitious, inclusive, and green policy commitments from IDA during IDA20.

What should the U.S. prioritize in IDA20 replenishment negotiations?

The global climate crisis has reached an unprecedented scale, making clear the urgent need for action by governments, multilateral organizations, and international financial institutions. Over the last four years, the Trump administration moved the U.S. backward in its approach to addressing climate while the impacts of climate change continued to mount. BIC welcomes the incoming Biden administration’s plans to prioritize climate action and emphasizes the need to deploy all available tools, so the U.S. can become a leader in addressing the climate crisis. 

In the international sphere, rejoining the Paris Agreement and supporting the Green Climate Fund (GCF) are crucial steps. Less recognized in the public conversation, but no less important, is the role that the U.S. plays at multilateral development banks (MDBs) — where it has traditionally been a leader and where total spending on climate still dwarfs that of the GCF. The MDBs have often invested in projects and policies that have accelerated climate change, but they also have the capacity to make valuable contributions toward mitigation and adaptation. MDBs are uniquely suited to help countries meet and build on their climate commitments by integrating climate considerations into development projects and stimulating a green COVID-19 recovery. For this reason, the U.S. should prioritize taking action to push the development banks to become “climate banks” as well.  BIC provides five steps the Biden Administration should take to lead the MDBs in a progressive climate response:

The MDBs have often invested in projects and policies that have accelerated climate change, but they also have the capacity to make valuable contributions toward mitigation and adaptation.

1. Rejoin the Paris Agreement and accelerate progress on clean energy transition. The Biden administration’s first critical step to signal to the world that the United States will reaffirm its climate commitment is by rejoining the Paris Agreement. The U.S. should then expeditiously create a plan to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement by working to halve greenhouse gas emissions by 2035, achieve net zero emissions by 2050, and provide a credible pathway for both goals. BIC recommends the Biden administration complement these domestic commitments at the international level. One way to do this is by promoting the World Bank’s efforts to help other countries develop ambitious plans to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions through trust funds and technical assistance. The U.S. should also work with allies to conclude negotiations on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement so that it achieves net reductions in emissions and increases investments by excluding double-counting. These steps will accelerate a clean energy transition, which is essential to building an equitable and green future.

2. Restore and advance the Obama administration's 2013 guidance on fossil fuel financing. In 2013, the Obama administration unveiled a Climate Action Plan, outlining steps for the U.S. to reduce its carbon footprint and lead international efforts to address climate change. Unfortunately, this policy was reversed by the Trump administration. BIC encourages the Biden administration to quickly restore this guidance and expand the 2013 policy to cover other fossil fuels not originally included and apply this to all MDBs in which the U.S. participates. This will promote the necessary global energy transition and take advantage of the steadily declining cost of renewable technologies relative to fossil fuels, even absent a global price set on greenhouse gas emissions.

3. Join and advance the goals of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action. The six Helsinki Principles guide the Coalition, and the World Bank is the secretariat for this group, representing over 50 countries. This group of Finance Ministers focuses on the mounting economic consequences of climate change, as well as the opportunities of climate action to create jobs and lead to GDP growth. Joining and signing onto the Helsinki Principles would be a positive way for the U.S. to signal a renewed commitment to addressing climate change through multilateral cooperation.

4. Appoint Executive Directors (EDs) to the MDBs that have a demonstrated commitment to collaborative action on climate, including climate justice. The clearest way for the Biden administration to fulfill its commitment to taking a leadership role on climate and push the MDBs to set ambitious climate agendas for themselves is through the appointment and confirmation of strong, qualified EDs to these institutions. These candidates should have significant development experience and, among other attributes, a commitment to working with our allies, particularly those in Europe, to combat climate change.

5. Use the voice and vote of the U.S. at the MDBs to lead the multilateral effort to mitigate and adapt to climate change. The Biden administration should insist that U.S. EDs at the MDBs reflect the administration’s ambitious approach to climate through their vote and participation in the institutions, and use this position to advance three key objectives. First, the U.S. should promote international efforts to control short-lived and highly potent greenhouse gases by having MDBs fund country implementation of the Kigali Agreement. Second, U.S. EDs should oppose the use of budget support loans (Development Policy Finance) to finance fossil fuels and harmful impacts on the environment, which can be achieved through the establishment at each MDB of an exclusion list and screening process. Finally, the U.S. must seize the opportunity to promote sustainable land-use planning, community-led conservation and development, and clean transportation through cooperation with allies and others who will benefit from these actions at the MDBs.

Above all, BIC encourages the Biden administration to proactively set an ambitious and inclusive climate agenda and use the United States’ position at the MDBs to take meaningful steps toward implementing this agenda through multilateral cooperation.

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Jack Tierney