We are a diverse group of non-profit organizations with varying missions that collectively believe in the value of the international financial institutions (IFIs).

Find relevant reports from our members and the Congressional Research Service, publications from the IFIs, and other useful resources.

In a CGD note earlier this year, we compared the scale of the multilateral development banks’ (MDBs) response in 2020 to the COVID-19 crisis to their response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC),  finding that, though commitments did increase substantially in 2020, their growth lagged well behind the expansion following the GFC. The smaller 2020 response contrasted with the relative scale of economic damage in the two periods. Developing economies suffered a 3.5 percent contraction in GDP in 2020, compared to slower but still positive 1 percent growth in 2009. This note expands on that analysis, updating the data to include the African Development Bank (AfDB) and disaggregating 2020 sovereign and non-sovereign commitments by sector and by country income group.

mdb-covid-19-crisis-response-where-did-money-go.pdf

MDB COVID-19 Crisis Response: Where Did the Money Go?

This document summarizes key takeaways from the meeting, including the remarks of four keynote speakers and themes raised in a discussion among 30 experts, who are listed in the appendix. The roundtable was moderated by Pam Dixon, founder and executive director of the World Privacy Forum, and co-chair of the working group for CGD’s Governing Data for Development project. 

how-can-multilaterals-strengthen-global-data-governance-brief.pdf

How Can Multilateral Organizations Strengthen Global Data Governance Practices? Roundtable Summary

China has emerged as a leading participant in multilateral development organizations. In many ways, this is a welcome development. Today’s global challenges, including COVID-19 and climate change, require an international response and have prompted renewed calls for increased multilateral engagement by the major economy countries. This, combined with the recognition of multilateral institutions’ high standards for transparency and environmental safeguards, have led the United States at times to encourage China to step up its multilateral contributions. At the same time, countervailing voices focused on strategic competition increasingly view China’s multilateral participation with skepticism.

mapping-chinas-participation-multilateral-development-institutions-and-funds-brief.pdf

Mapping China’s Participation in Multilateral Development Institutions and Funds

Open Letter to G20 Finance Ministers, Central Bank Governors and the IMF

As the pandemic exacerbates multiple crises in developing countries, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are a crucial option to help finance the COVID response and hasten an equitable and inclusive economic recovery. With the SDR distribution being proportional to IMF countries’ quotas, the new allocation of US$650 billion does not ensure sufficient SDRs go to developing countries. This is why many have been calling for an allocation in the order of US$3 trillion.

Moreover, advanced economies are in less need of SDRs given their access to a wider array of monetary and financial tools for the response and recovery. Thus, it is essential that the recent allocation be quickly followed by rechanneling a significant portion of advanced economies’ SDRs to developing countries. We strongly believe that successful and equitable recovery is contingent on transparency and a participatory process inclusive of civil society in all countries. This also applies to international spaces making decisions on SDR channeling mechanisms, including the G20 and the IMF, where civil society has not had, so far, sufficient opportunities to engage on this matter.

We urge you to ensure SDR channeling options align with a basic framework of principles that many academics, experts and civil society colleagues around the world echoed over recent months.

Provide debt-free financing, so it does not add to unsustainable debt burdens of developing countries, whose annual external public debt payments are projected to average US$300 billion over 2021 and 2022. Grant-based financing is ideal but, if additional loans are to be offered, then maximum concessionality is critical (zero interest and lengthy repayment terms with extended grace periods).

Refrain from tying transfers to policy conditionality (directly or indirectly). Conditionality will lengthen the time it takes to negotiate such financing, could force countries into adopting difficult adjustment or austerity measures; or put the financing beyond reach for countries unable to comply with such conditions.

Be accessible to middle-income countries. These countries have persistently been left out of debt relief initiatives and concessional financing, and should not be excluded from yet another financial assistance option when many of them face deep debt distress and challenging pandemic vulnerabilities.

Include transparency and accountability safeguards on both providers and recipients of such financing in the spirit of democratic ownership, strengthening independent scrutiny, participation and accountability to citizens.

Ensure that SDR contributions are additional to existing ODA and climate finance commitments. Only SDRs channelled to developing countries as grants should count as ODA, or, where appropriate, against the climate finance goal of US$100 billion.

Prioritize SDR use that expands international grant funding for combatting the pandemic through budget support for public services and the public sector workforce in health and education, for social protection and other needs. Grants can also target promotion of a fair recovery that supports climate justice, and tackles economic and gender inequality, including the unpaid care burden that women bear, and the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated.

We also call for agreement on a global repository to report on channeled SDRs. This will help limit fragmentation and be an important measure for accountability of commitments and tracking the overall impact of SDRs, including for ongoing learning.

We are aware that the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) is being considered as a favoured option for SDRs channeling; however, it is important to note that the PRGT does not reflect the principles of being debt-free, conditionality-free, and accessible to all developing countries. We urge you to consider ways to improve the PRGT option, including channeling via its emergency financing vehicle (Rapid Credit Facility).

We also encourage you to identify SDR channeling mechanisms that support debt cancellation, including through the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust, and to consider alternative options which align best with the principles stated above. To create options to scale up SDR channeling volumes and reach more developing countries we encourage you to seriously discuss alternative options beyond the PRGT and beyond the IMF more broadly. However, other rechanneling vehicles under discussion, such as a Resilience and Sustainability Trust and Multilateral Development Banks, still appear far from embodying these principles.

Finally, neither the initial SDR allocation nor the channeling of SDRs can be a substitute for the urgent implementation of debt relief measures that benefit both low- and middle- income countries, especially to ensure that the additional resources are not directed to repay external private and other creditors.

Read this letter in Spanish and Arabic

1. Access to Human Rights International (AHRI)

4. Advocacy Initiative for Development (AID)

5. Africa Network for Environment and Economic Justice (ANEEJ)

6. African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD)

7. African Women’s Development and Communication Network (FEMNET)

9. Alliance for Sustainable Development Organization (ASDO)

11. Associated Country Women of the World

13. AULA TIDEs UN SDGs Action Education & Programming

17. Burundi Rugby League Rugby a XIII Cooperative, Central & East Africa

18. Campaign for Human Rights and Development International CHRDI, Sierra Leone, West Africa

19. Campaña Latinoamericana por el Derecho a la Educación (CLADE)

22. Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR)

24. Civil Society Action Coalition on Education for All

25. Coalition for Health Workers (HRH PLUS)

26. Confederation of Indonesia People Movement (KPRI)

27. Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Desarrollo

28. Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN)

29. Derecho Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (DAR)

31. Diverse Voices and Action (DIVA) for Equality

32. Ekumenická akademie (Ecumenical Academy)

33. Equidad de Género: Ciudadanía, Trabajo y Familia

34. Estonian Roundtable for Development Cooperation

35. European Network on Debt and Development (EURODAD)

37. FENASSEP/ISP, SINERGIE DES TRAVAILLEURS DU TOGO/STT

41. FOKUS — Forum for Women and Development

42. Fundacion para Estudio e Investigacion de la Mujer

43. Fundación para la Democracia Internacional

49. Global Coalition Against Poverty (GCAP)

51. Global Socio-economic and Financial Evolution Network (GSFEN)

53. Health Action International Asia Pacific

54. Indigenous Peoples Global Forum for Sustainable Development, (International Indegeous Platforme)

56. Institute of the Blessed Virgin Mary — Loreto Generalate

57. Internacional de Servicios Públicos (ISP)

58. International Council for Adult Education

59. International Women’s Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific (IWRAW Asia Pacific)

63. Latin American Network for Economic and Social Rights (LATINDADD)

67. Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate

71. Okogun Odigie Safewomb International Foundation (OOSAIF)

73. Plateforme française Dette et Développement (PFDD)

74. Red de Justicia Fiscal para América Latina y El Caribe RJFALC

82. Servicios Ecumenios para Reconciliacion y Reconstuccion

Civil Society Organizations Call for Principles for Fair Channeling of Special Drawing Rights

Ahead of COP26, E3G takes a look at what is expected, and needed, from the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).

This briefing paper looks at three elements:

The state of play ahead of COP26 – A summary of the progress individual MDBs have made in five areas. These are; Paris alignment, fossil fuel exclusions, climate finance, climate risk and nature based solutions. 

Increasing the scale of finance – This will focus on the need for MDBs to deploy sufficient public capital and increase their role as mobilisers of private capital.

Expected MDB Announcements at COP26 – A summary of when announcements by the MDBs will be made.

MDBs_COP26.pdf

The position of Multilateral Development Banks ahead of COP26

Good food begins with farmers. With the United Nations Food Systems Summit, Nutrition for Growth and Climate COP in 2021, there is a heightened sense of opportunity for coordinated action to improve the health, livelihoods, productivity and sustainability of smallholder farmers. 

There are a lot of actors and stakeholders working on the path to achieving SDG2 targets. In recent years there have been several new reports, including Ceres2030, the SOFI, PARI 2020, Foresight 2.0, initiatives, and global and regional strategies that could provide a roadmap. Because of sectoral silos, many of these are not well known within the SDG2 community and even less known in the broader SDG community. There are also growing financing needs as a result of increasing numbers of crises and rising hunger. In the absence of a clearly articulated, aligned policy consensus across a wide range of stakeholders, all of this contributes to a sense of competing priorities and that we are not getting the collective impact we hope and expect from the work that is being done. This is not good enough and more can be done. 

The SDG2 Advocacy Hub is working with partners to explore the idea of a call to action for a new consensus for smallholder farmers that could contribute to and build on the momentum of these global summits, align policy priorities, drive decision-making and investment, especially as we “build back better” from COVID-19, and support greater coordinated collaboration during this Decade of Action to deliver the Global Goals by 2030.  

Exploring a New Consensus with Smallholder Farmers

This note is not meant be a comprehensive blueprint for reform of the IMF and/or its lending facilities, particularly those accessed by MICs. And clearly other global factors have played into the demand for IMF resources, such as the huge monetary impulse during the pandemic from the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and other central banks. But we hope to provoke a discussion about why, during a time of an unparalleled global economic crisis, the IMF’s regular balance sheet has been largely untapped. There is no one cause, but a complex set of rules, principles, perceptions, misperceptions, and guidelines that bind the IMF and its member countries into positions where a pool of badly need capital sits largely dormant. As the saying goes, let’s not waste a good crisis—perhaps the pandemic will bring about a detailed and multipronged examination of the IMF’s lending instruments that is long overdue.

what-do-mics-want-from-imf-after-covid.pdf

What Do Middle-Income Countries Want from the IMF as They Look to Recover from the Pandemic?

Many countries no longer need IDA, but some need it more than ever. Is it still fit for purpose? Does it focus on the right countries? Does it allocate its resources to them in the best way? Does it offer them the right products? Does it prioritise the most salient issues? Does it have systems and processes that maximise its effectiveness? Do the people responsible for its decisions have the right skills and experience? And how big should it be given today’s challenges?

what-next-for-IDA.pdf

Finance institutions take money from foreign aid budgets to invest in private enterprises. How much should they be given? We can make some progress on that question by looking at the return on investment in the form of higher real incomes for workers and customers, and comparing that to a cash transfer benchmark. There is considerable uncertainty, but what evidence we have suggests returns on investment are in a range that compares well to that benchmark. There is also a diversification argument that because we don’t know which of the things that aid can finance will ultimately prove most important for poverty eradication, aid allocation should hedge its bets. A low single digit percentage of aid allocated to increase the quantity and quality of private investment in low- and middle-income countries seems reasonable.

are-development-finance-institutions-good-value-money.pdf

Are Development Finance Institutions Good Value for Money?

Publish What You Fund has developed the DFI Transparency Tool to improve the systematic and timely disclosure of relevant information by development finance institutions (DFIs). The tool is designed to meet two functions: 

 Provide detailed, granular guidance to DFIs on the information they should disclose. 

 Provide the framework for analysis by which Publish What You Fund will measure DFI transparency in an initial public pilot index in late 2022. 

This DFI Transparency Tool is the culmination of two years of in depth and collaborative research assessing the disclosure practices of the world’s leading multilateral and bilateral DFIs. Further details of our research findings and the rationale for the tool can be found in our Advancing DFI Transparency report. DFIs can improve their transparency by providing comparable, timely, and relevant information for use by a range of stakeholders in line with the specific information fields included in the tool.

DFI-Transparency-Tool.pdf

We developed this tool based on the evidence from our research and in collaboration with the different stakeholders we have worked with throughout the duration of the project. Initial consultations with stakeholders demonstrate support, but not complete agreement, on our approach, while understanding that some of the information fields are ambitious and will require effort to meet. It is our hope that by providing the specific information fields that should be disclosed we can improve the transparency of DFIs by providing comparable, timely, and relevant information for use by a range of stakeholders.

Publish What You Fund has developed the DFI Transparency Tool to improve the systematic and timely disclosure of relevant information by development finance institutions (DFIs). The tool provides detailed, granular guidance to DFIs on the information they should disclose to improve their transparency. We will also use it as a framework to measure DFI transparency in a public index in late 2022.

Advancing-DFITransparency.pdf

Advancing DFI Transparency - The rationale and roadmap for better impact, accountability and markets

Advancing-DFI-Transparency-Executive-Summary-1.pdf

Advancing DFI Transparency - Executive Summary 

The IFI Working Group hosted a virtual briefing on October 27 featuring the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP). The session explored how these international financial institutions and others contribute to the common goal of ending hunger globally.  

Filmona Hailemichael, U.S. Policy and Government Affairs Director, Global Citizen 

Alberta Guerra, Senior Policy Analyst, ActionAid USA 

Ron Hartman, Director, Global Engagement, Partnership, and Resource Mobilization, IFAD

Kathryn Hollifield, Program Manager, GAFSP 

Jordan Teague, Interim Director, Policy Analysis and Coalition Building, Bread for the World

IFI WG Hill Handout - FY22 Appropriations  (2) (1).pdf

Fiscal Year 2022 Appropriations - Funding for the IFIs

The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) Working Group is a diverse coalition of non-profit organizations. We collectively believe in the value of IFIs in addressing global development challenges, advancing multilateralism, and setting high standards across the development finance landscape.

Handout IFIs Working Group Overview .pdf

Amidst a historic global crisis, the Biden Administration’s first budget request reflects its commitment to U.S. global leadership and multilateralism. According to the World Bank, the coronavirus crisis, which shows no signs of abating in the developing world, threatens to push 150 million people into extreme poverty by the end of 2021 and reverse decades of developmental progress. For many developing economies, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are a critical lifeline, providing invaluable resources and support. The Administration’s budget request constitutes a vital commitment to these institutions and their essential role in rebuilding the world economy.

Analysis-Presidents_FY22_Budget_Request.pdf

Analysis: The President's FY22 Budget Request and the International Financial Institutions

In August 2021, the IMF Board of Governors approved a $650 billion allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) - the largest in the history of the IMF to boost global liquidity and help countries recover from COVID-19 crisis.

SDRs are allocated to IMF member countries in proportion to their existing quotas with US$275 billion going to emerging market and developing countries. Advanced economies have the option to re-allocate or "channel" their SDRs to low-income countries. 

SDR_A_Primer-Website.pdf

Overall, the papers focus on how the WBG’s policy and programmatic interventions can be best focused to result in tangible change in the lives of affected communities and to ensure that no one is left behind. Among the recommendations put forth, the most consistent across the five thematic papers include: 

Expand partnerships with NGOs and meaningfully engage refugees, host communities, and local civil society to strengthen institutional response and coordination. Among the IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities (RSW) projects, only four projects acknowledged the importance of partnerships with NGOs. 

Conduct contextualized analysis of forcibly displaced populations and identify barriers that hinder access to basic social services and economic opportunities. The analysis should include socio-political aspects and other non-legal barriers that impede displaced persons from accessing services and opportunities. The analysis should also identify where integrated approaches across relevant sectors are required. This can help the Bank better understand how to strengthen project interventions and identify areas where it can better support government policies and practices. 

Share existing evidence and lessons learned in managing forced displacement crises across Bank teams and external actors to build capacity and expertise on what works in a diverse range of fragile and forced displacement settings. 

Leverage internal resources and knowledge to ensure a more coherent WBG approach is adapted to and applied to forced displacement settings. The WBG has rich experience and extensive resources in addressing issues like gender and legal identity through a variety of frameworks, tools and initiatives. These resources should be expanded to cover the forcibly displaced in all their diversity. By harmonizing and improving linkages across resources within the WBG, programming and financing will be more effectively designed and implemented to respond to displacement challenges.

Thematic-Papers-on-Fragile-Forced-Displacement-Contexts.pdf

Thematic Papers on Fragile & Forced Displacement Contexts: Recommendations for the World Bank Group and Other Investors 

The reallocation of SDRs into the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) is a channel that has already been used by several countries (see here and here), and the IMF has called on advanced countries to use some of their new SDRs to buttress the PRGT further. But many have pointed out that loans from the PRGT can only be used to support a prescribed list of low-income countries for a limited set of purposes. Thus, there have been calls for another IMF-based fund that can support a larger number of countries, particularly vulnerable middle-income countries (MICs), and can be used to provide financial flexibility as LMICs confront recovery from the pandemic and the transition to a resilient, sustainable, and equitable future global economy. This note considers the technical challenges of establishing such a fund, which we dub a Global Resilience Trust (GRT).

The reallocation of SDRs into the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) is a channel that has already been used by several countries (see here and here), and the IMF has called on advanced countries to use some of their new SDRs to buttress the PRGT further.

reallocating-SDRs-IMF-global-resilience-trust_.pdf

Reallocating SDRs into an IMF Global Resilience Trust

A significant proportion of DFI financing is channelled through financial intermediaries (FIs) such as national and commercial banks in developing economies, microfinance institutions, and private equity funds. These types of institutions allow DFIs to significantly broaden their scope and reach more clients by effectively disaggregating finance to a scale suitable for smaller stakeholders such as SMEs. However, the introduction of an additional step in the financial value chain has implications for transparency; the extent and detail of sub-project disclosure is almost always less than that with direct investments. A lack of transparency means that it is unclear where a great deal of this development finance ends up, the development impacts that it has, and the environment and social risks that it holds for project affected communities.

Our working paper, published in August 2021, found that the level of DFI FI transparency is low, particularly at the level of sub-investments, making it near-impossible to track the flow of development finance. Our research examined the transparency of 17 bilateral and multilateral DFIs and found that:

There are numerous examples of data disclosure via sources other than the DFI.

The Equator Principles offer an example of financial sector disclosure that can inform efforts to improve DFI FI disclosure.

National banking privacy regulations can act as a barrier to improving transparency. However, these can be partly addressed by financial institutions seeking consent to disclose from their clients.

DFI-Transparency-Initiative-WS5-Financial-Intermediaries.pdf

DFI Transparency Initiative Work Stream Five: Financial Intermediaries

Resources