We are a diverse group of non-profit organizations with varying missions that collectively believe in the value of the international financial institutions (IFIs).

Find relevant reports from our members and the Congressional Research Service, publications from the IFIs, and other useful resources.

As part of the DFI Transparency Initiative, Publish What You Fund has developed the DFI Transparency Tool. Based on over two years of research, the DFI Transparency Tool has two functions. First, it is intended to provide granular guidance to development finance institutions (DFIs) about the types of information that a range of stakeholders value and should therefore be disclosed publicly. 1 Second, it forms the basis of future and ongoing assessments of the transparency of a group of leading DFIs. The purpose of this second function is to provide an independent means with which to assess and improve the state of DFI transparency. Publish What You Fund will carry out assessments that will score and rank the transparency of DFIs in a publicly released DFI Transparency Index. 

The aims of the DFI Transparency Index are: 

To assess the transparency of the world’s foremost DFIs. 

To encourage DFIs to carry out their functions in a transparent manner. 

To track and encourage progress and facilitate peer learning, while holding DFIs to account. 

This methodology is informed by the research that has been conducted as part of the DFI Transparency Initiative. This research has been presented through a series of working papers, blogs, and a research report that accompanied the launch of the DFI Transparency Tool in November 2021. The Publish What You Fund team has been supported by consultations with individual stakeholders from many institutions and organisations and conducted stakeholder consultations on the methodology.

DFI Transparency Index Methodology - Final.pdf

In response to a severe and urgent crisis, the President of the United States of America is announcing the President’s Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE) to support developing countries and communities in vulnerable situations around the world in their efforts to adapt to and manage the impacts of climate change. These impacts are already being felt, making investments in developing countries’ climate resilience more urgent than ever. 

The President will work with Congress to provide $3 billion in adaptation finance annually for PREPARE by FY2024. It is the largest U.S. commitment ever made to reduce climate impacts on those most vulnerable to climate change worldwide. 

PREPARE will serve as the cornerstone of the U.S. government response to operationalizing the President’s pledge and addressing the increasing impacts of the global climate crisis. PREPARE activates a coordinated, whole-of-government approach and will serve as the framework that brings together the diplomatic, development, and technical expertise of the United States to help more than half a billion people in developing countries adapt to and manage the impacts of climate change by 2030, to track with the timeline for meeting the Sustainable Development Goals. Through PREPARE, the United States will respond to partner countries’ priorities, strengthen cooperation with other donors, integrate climate risk considerations into multilateral efforts, and strive to mobilize significant private sector capital for adaptation. As a result, PREPARE will help save lives and livelihoods, support sustainable and healthy communities and ecosystems, and reduce the impacts of climate change.

Full-PREPARE-Plan.pdf

President’s Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE)

Transcript of the House Financial Services Hearing on the State of the International Financial System, which occurred on April 6, 2022. 

President Biden signal this commitment last year with his first budget proposal, when boosted us contributions to the multilateral development bank's global climate finance efforts and food insecurity programs by 73%. This was followed by Secretary Yellen support for a new allocation of Special Drawing Rights at the International Monetary Fund, which provided $275 billion liquidity boost to emerging economies to help them respond to the global pandemic. There will also be a new test of the strength of the international financial system and its international financial institution

House_Financial_Services_on_State_of_the_International_Financial_System_-_POLITICO_PRO.pdf

House Financial Services Hearing on State of the International Financial System

The undersigned are members of the NGO Collaborative and its partners and allies, a group of NGOs, researchers, and practitioners dedicated to reaching SDG 1 through economic inclusion programs that help the poorest increase assets and income. Members have regularly engaged with the Partnership for Economic Inclusion (PEI) housed at the World Bank to support robust knowledge exchange, expand awareness of best practices, and contribute to the growing evidence base for social and economic inclusion programs. 

Economic inclusion programs help boost the income and assets of the world’s poorest individuals and households with a “big push” of coordinated interventions – usually a combination of cash or in-kind transfers, skills training or coaching, access to finance, and links to market support.

NGO-Collaborative-IDA-Letter.pdf

The Administration budget proposal for FY 2022 proposes to exempt securities issued by IDA from Securities and Exchange Commission registration requirements by according IDA securities the same exemption that currently applies to the securities of IBRD, IFC and other MDBs in which the United States is a member. If granted, over the next five years, the exemption will permit IDA to provide countries nearly $700 million of additional resources on the existing pledge platform.

The U.S. Congress is at work this week to reach an agreement on an FY22 spending bill to avoid a government shutdown and provide much needed aid to Ukraine. The bill would also include annual funding for the International Financial Institutions (IFIs).

One item BWC hopes to see in the bill is an exemption for the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) from costly registration requirements with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). If granted, this exemption will permit IDA to provide low-income countries nearly $700 million in additional resources. Read this explainer on the issue published by BWC’s Legislative Working Group.

LWG_Securities IDA Explainer_Final_1.pdf

Explainer: Securities Registration Exemption for IDA

Amidst the backdrop of the Ukraine crisis and the ongoing global pandemic, the U.S. Congress has passed an omnibus spending bill for FY22 including annual funding for the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). The good news is that Biden Administration requests for the World Bank (IBRD and IDA) annual appropriations for FY22 were fully funded, and certain IMF support for low-income country funding. The African Development Bank and African Development Fund were also fully funded including paying down some AfDF arrears (unmet contributions). The Asian Development Fund was also fully funded including some arrears. The bad news is that Congress failed to secure key authorizations required to lend SDRs to the IMF, to provide a SEC registration exemption to IDA, and to fund the next replenishment of the Asian Development Fund. It also did not deliver on paying down arrears to IDA. Below we outline what was funded, what was not, and the implications for the IFIs.

Amidst the backdrop of the Ukraine crisis and the ongoing global pandemic, the U.S. Congress has passed an omnibus spending bill for FY22 including annual funding for the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Read analysis from BWC’s Legislative Working Group on what was funded, what was not, and the implications for the IFIs.

BWC FY22 Omnibus Analysis_Final.pdf

This paper aims to determine the extent to which gender was considered in the Inter-American Development Bank’s (IDB) operations aimed at responding to the COVID pandemic and associated economic crisis. Using keywords to identify COVID response projects, we found 264 projects approved between March 1, 2020, and July 31, 2021 for our analysis. We found that 135 projects (51 percent) had publicly available project documents for analysis, and of these, 32 projects (24 percent) included gender-focused indicators in their results frameworks. Most gender indicators focus on women as participants of social protection programs or as owners of small- and medium-sized enterprises. Our recommendations to the IDB include increasing transparency by publishing more project documents and ensuring gender indicators are included in projects’ results frameworks across sectors. This project builds on previous analysis of gender integration in COVID response projects at the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and African Development Bank. 

This paper aims to determine the extent to which gender was considered in the Inter-American Development Bank’s (IDB) operations aimed at responding to the COVID pandemic and associated economic crisis. Using keywords to identify COVID response projects, we found 264 projects approved between March 1, 2020, and July 31, 2021 for our analysis. We found that 135 projects (51 percent) had publicly available project documents for analysis, and of these, 32 projects (24 percent) included gender-focused indicators in their results frameworks.

idb-covid-19-response-projects-and-gender-integration.pdf

IDB COVID-19 Response Projects and Gender Integration

Many stress the critical role of the private sector in filling yawning sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) infrastructure finance gaps, only widened by the pandemic. Our paper looks in detail at financially closed (construction-ready) transactions with private participation in SSA from 2007–2020. Despite the “billions to trillions” vision, we find no sustained upward trends for such transactions in volumes of total finance, multilateral development bank (MDB) finance, private finance, the share or volume of local private finance, participation by international institutional investors, or finance from bilateral development finance institutions (DFIs). External finance sources were larger than local sources, with Chinese DFIs dominant and the US DFI a marginal actor. Among MDBs, the African Development Bank provided the most finance cumulatively. Investment in renewable energy outpaced investment in fossil fuel infrastructure, but MDBs continued to make significant fossil fuel investments. Investment in water and social infrastructure remains about 5 percent of the total. 

Policy implications include: the urgent need for greater MDB efforts to use their broad toolkits to catalyze more private infrastructure finance, including from local sources and in social sectors; the case for building on the African Development Bank’s advantages; the importance of growing the US Development Finance Corporation’s efforts; and the strong logic for more collaboration among infrastructure finance providers to SSA, including China, with MDBs providing not only finance but also fora for collaboration and support for the policy and institutional reforms that build sustainability and reduce risk for all actors. 

Many stress the critical role of the private sector in filling yawning sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) infrastructure finance gaps, only widened by the pandemic. Our paper looks in detail at financially closed (construction-ready) transactions with private participation in SSA from 2007-2020.

stuck-near-ten-billion-public-private-infrastructure-finance-sub-saharan-africa.pdf

Stuck Near Ten Billion: Public-Private Infrastructure Finance in Sub-Saharan Africa

On February 17, 2022, CGD Distinguished Non-Resident Fellow Daouda Sembene appeared before the National Security, International Development, and Monetary Policy Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee at a hearing titled “The Role of the International Monetary Fund in a Changing Global Landscape.” Watch the full hearing here. 

On February 17, 2022, CGD Distinguished Non-Resident Fellow Daouda Sembene appeared before the National Security, International Development, and Monetary Policy Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee at a hearing titled “The Role of the International Monetary Fund in a Changing Global Landscape.”

testimony-role-international-monetary-fund-changing-global-landscape.pdf

Testimony on the Role of the International Monetary Fund in a Changing Global Landscape

In the face of sudden economic shocks and natural disasters that limit the ability of economies to rapidly raise revenue, MDBs have the potential to play a leading role in crisis response to minimize the damage. One key factor in their success in this role is the speed of their financing instruments—how quickly do they get funds to where they are needed after a crisis strikes? Using a calculated metric we term “relative disbursement rate,” our analysis finds that at both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), budget support operations are by far the fastest instrument, in some cases even outpacing crisis-specific instruments. We also find that most of the crisis-response specific instruments used by these institutions are contingency-based, meaning they are approved well before they would conceivably need to be disbursed. For these instruments, we find that speed is more accurately gauged by “response time” or the time between a crisis event and disbursement, and that at both institutions, this metric improved during the COVID-19 crisis. Together, these findings suggest that when it comes to crisis response, preparation is key—disbursement speed is much faster where instruments have advanced-design elements and policy actions that are already completed prior to approval. 

In the face of sudden economic shocks and natural disasters that limit the ability of economies to rapidly raise revenue, MDBs have the potential to play a leading role in crisis response to minimize the damage. One key factor in their success in this role is the speed of their financing instruments—how quickly do they get funds to where they are needed after a crisis strikes?

MDB-crisis-response.pdf

Multilateral Development Banks’ Crisis Response: What Instruments Do MDBs Offer and How Fast Do They Act?

In a CGD note earlier this year, we compared the scale of the multilateral development banks’ (MDBs) response in 2020 to the COVID-19 crisis to their response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC),  finding that, though commitments did increase substantially in 2020, their growth lagged well behind the expansion following the GFC. The smaller 2020 response contrasted with the relative scale of economic damage in the two periods. Developing economies suffered a 3.5 percent contraction in GDP in 2020, compared to slower but still positive 1 percent growth in 2009. This note expands on that analysis, updating the data to include the African Development Bank (AfDB) and disaggregating 2020 sovereign and non-sovereign commitments by sector and by country income group.

mdb-covid-19-crisis-response-where-did-money-go.pdf

MDB COVID-19 Crisis Response: Where Did the Money Go?

This document summarizes key takeaways from the meeting, including the remarks of four keynote speakers and themes raised in a discussion among 30 experts, who are listed in the appendix. The roundtable was moderated by Pam Dixon, founder and executive director of the World Privacy Forum, and co-chair of the working group for CGD’s Governing Data for Development project. 

how-can-multilaterals-strengthen-global-data-governance-brief.pdf

How Can Multilateral Organizations Strengthen Global Data Governance Practices? Roundtable Summary

China has emerged as a leading participant in multilateral development organizations. In many ways, this is a welcome development. Today’s global challenges, including COVID-19 and climate change, require an international response and have prompted renewed calls for increased multilateral engagement by the major economy countries. This, combined with the recognition of multilateral institutions’ high standards for transparency and environmental safeguards, have led the United States at times to encourage China to step up its multilateral contributions. At the same time, countervailing voices focused on strategic competition increasingly view China’s multilateral participation with skepticism.

mapping-chinas-participation-multilateral-development-institutions-and-funds-brief.pdf

Mapping China’s Participation in Multilateral Development Institutions and Funds

Open Letter to G20 Finance Ministers, Central Bank Governors and the IMF

As the pandemic exacerbates multiple crises in developing countries, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are a crucial option to help finance the COVID response and hasten an equitable and inclusive economic recovery. With the SDR distribution being proportional to IMF countries’ quotas, the new allocation of US$650 billion does not ensure sufficient SDRs go to developing countries. This is why many have been calling for an allocation in the order of US$3 trillion.

Moreover, advanced economies are in less need of SDRs given their access to a wider array of monetary and financial tools for the response and recovery. Thus, it is essential that the recent allocation be quickly followed by rechanneling a significant portion of advanced economies’ SDRs to developing countries. We strongly believe that successful and equitable recovery is contingent on transparency and a participatory process inclusive of civil society in all countries. This also applies to international spaces making decisions on SDR channeling mechanisms, including the G20 and the IMF, where civil society has not had, so far, sufficient opportunities to engage on this matter.

We urge you to ensure SDR channeling options align with a basic framework of principles that many academics, experts and civil society colleagues around the world echoed over recent months.

Provide debt-free financing, so it does not add to unsustainable debt burdens of developing countries, whose annual external public debt payments are projected to average US$300 billion over 2021 and 2022. Grant-based financing is ideal but, if additional loans are to be offered, then maximum concessionality is critical (zero interest and lengthy repayment terms with extended grace periods).

Refrain from tying transfers to policy conditionality (directly or indirectly). Conditionality will lengthen the time it takes to negotiate such financing, could force countries into adopting difficult adjustment or austerity measures; or put the financing beyond reach for countries unable to comply with such conditions.

Be accessible to middle-income countries. These countries have persistently been left out of debt relief initiatives and concessional financing, and should not be excluded from yet another financial assistance option when many of them face deep debt distress and challenging pandemic vulnerabilities.

Include transparency and accountability safeguards on both providers and recipients of such financing in the spirit of democratic ownership, strengthening independent scrutiny, participation and accountability to citizens.

Ensure that SDR contributions are additional to existing ODA and climate finance commitments. Only SDRs channelled to developing countries as grants should count as ODA, or, where appropriate, against the climate finance goal of US$100 billion.

Prioritize SDR use that expands international grant funding for combatting the pandemic through budget support for public services and the public sector workforce in health and education, for social protection and other needs. Grants can also target promotion of a fair recovery that supports climate justice, and tackles economic and gender inequality, including the unpaid care burden that women bear, and the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated.

We also call for agreement on a global repository to report on channeled SDRs. This will help limit fragmentation and be an important measure for accountability of commitments and tracking the overall impact of SDRs, including for ongoing learning.

We are aware that the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) is being considered as a favoured option for SDRs channeling; however, it is important to note that the PRGT does not reflect the principles of being debt-free, conditionality-free, and accessible to all developing countries. We urge you to consider ways to improve the PRGT option, including channeling via its emergency financing vehicle (Rapid Credit Facility).

We also encourage you to identify SDR channeling mechanisms that support debt cancellation, including through the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust, and to consider alternative options which align best with the principles stated above. To create options to scale up SDR channeling volumes and reach more developing countries we encourage you to seriously discuss alternative options beyond the PRGT and beyond the IMF more broadly. However, other rechanneling vehicles under discussion, such as a Resilience and Sustainability Trust and Multilateral Development Banks, still appear far from embodying these principles.

Finally, neither the initial SDR allocation nor the channeling of SDRs can be a substitute for the urgent implementation of debt relief measures that benefit both low- and middle- income countries, especially to ensure that the additional resources are not directed to repay external private and other creditors.

Read this letter in Spanish and Arabic

1. Access to Human Rights International (AHRI)

4. Advocacy Initiative for Development (AID)

5. Africa Network for Environment and Economic Justice (ANEEJ)

6. African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD)

7. African Women’s Development and Communication Network (FEMNET)

9. Alliance for Sustainable Development Organization (ASDO)

11. Associated Country Women of the World

13. AULA TIDEs UN SDGs Action Education & Programming

17. Burundi Rugby League Rugby a XIII Cooperative, Central & East Africa

18. Campaign for Human Rights and Development International CHRDI, Sierra Leone, West Africa

19. Campaña Latinoamericana por el Derecho a la Educación (CLADE)

22. Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR)

24. Civil Society Action Coalition on Education for All

25. Coalition for Health Workers (HRH PLUS)

26. Confederation of Indonesia People Movement (KPRI)

27. Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Desarrollo

28. Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN)

29. Derecho Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (DAR)

31. Diverse Voices and Action (DIVA) for Equality

32. Ekumenická akademie (Ecumenical Academy)

33. Equidad de Género: Ciudadanía, Trabajo y Familia

34. Estonian Roundtable for Development Cooperation

35. European Network on Debt and Development (EURODAD)

37. FENASSEP/ISP, SINERGIE DES TRAVAILLEURS DU TOGO/STT

41. FOKUS — Forum for Women and Development

42. Fundacion para Estudio e Investigacion de la Mujer

43. Fundación para la Democracia Internacional

49. Global Coalition Against Poverty (GCAP)

51. Global Socio-economic and Financial Evolution Network (GSFEN)

53. Health Action International Asia Pacific

54. Indigenous Peoples Global Forum for Sustainable Development, (International Indegeous Platforme)

56. Institute of the Blessed Virgin Mary — Loreto Generalate

57. Internacional de Servicios Públicos (ISP)

58. International Council for Adult Education

59. International Women’s Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific (IWRAW Asia Pacific)

63. Latin American Network for Economic and Social Rights (LATINDADD)

67. Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate

71. Okogun Odigie Safewomb International Foundation (OOSAIF)

73. Plateforme française Dette et Développement (PFDD)

74. Red de Justicia Fiscal para América Latina y El Caribe RJFALC

82. Servicios Ecumenios para Reconciliacion y Reconstuccion

Civil Society Organizations Call for Principles for Fair Channeling of Special Drawing Rights

Ahead of COP26, E3G takes a look at what is expected, and needed, from the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).

This briefing paper looks at three elements:

The state of play ahead of COP26 – A summary of the progress individual MDBs have made in five areas. These are; Paris alignment, fossil fuel exclusions, climate finance, climate risk and nature based solutions. 

Increasing the scale of finance – This will focus on the need for MDBs to deploy sufficient public capital and increase their role as mobilisers of private capital.

Expected MDB Announcements at COP26 – A summary of when announcements by the MDBs will be made.

MDBs_COP26.pdf

The position of Multilateral Development Banks ahead of COP26

Good food begins with farmers. With the United Nations Food Systems Summit, Nutrition for Growth and Climate COP in 2021, there is a heightened sense of opportunity for coordinated action to improve the health, livelihoods, productivity and sustainability of smallholder farmers. 

There are a lot of actors and stakeholders working on the path to achieving SDG2 targets. In recent years there have been several new reports, including Ceres2030, the SOFI, PARI 2020, Foresight 2.0, initiatives, and global and regional strategies that could provide a roadmap. Because of sectoral silos, many of these are not well known within the SDG2 community and even less known in the broader SDG community. There are also growing financing needs as a result of increasing numbers of crises and rising hunger. In the absence of a clearly articulated, aligned policy consensus across a wide range of stakeholders, all of this contributes to a sense of competing priorities and that we are not getting the collective impact we hope and expect from the work that is being done. This is not good enough and more can be done. 

The SDG2 Advocacy Hub is working with partners to explore the idea of a call to action for a new consensus for smallholder farmers that could contribute to and build on the momentum of these global summits, align policy priorities, drive decision-making and investment, especially as we “build back better” from COVID-19, and support greater coordinated collaboration during this Decade of Action to deliver the Global Goals by 2030.  

Exploring a New Consensus with Smallholder Farmers

This note is not meant be a comprehensive blueprint for reform of the IMF and/or its lending facilities, particularly those accessed by MICs. And clearly other global factors have played into the demand for IMF resources, such as the huge monetary impulse during the pandemic from the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and other central banks. But we hope to provoke a discussion about why, during a time of an unparalleled global economic crisis, the IMF’s regular balance sheet has been largely untapped. There is no one cause, but a complex set of rules, principles, perceptions, misperceptions, and guidelines that bind the IMF and its member countries into positions where a pool of badly need capital sits largely dormant. As the saying goes, let’s not waste a good crisis—perhaps the pandemic will bring about a detailed and multipronged examination of the IMF’s lending instruments that is long overdue.

what-do-mics-want-from-imf-after-covid.pdf

What Do Middle-Income Countries Want from the IMF as They Look to Recover from the Pandemic?

Many countries no longer need IDA, but some need it more than ever. Is it still fit for purpose? Does it focus on the right countries? Does it allocate its resources to them in the best way? Does it offer them the right products? Does it prioritise the most salient issues? Does it have systems and processes that maximise its effectiveness? Do the people responsible for its decisions have the right skills and experience? And how big should it be given today’s challenges?

what-next-for-IDA.pdf

Finance institutions take money from foreign aid budgets to invest in private enterprises. How much should they be given? We can make some progress on that question by looking at the return on investment in the form of higher real incomes for workers and customers, and comparing that to a cash transfer benchmark. There is considerable uncertainty, but what evidence we have suggests returns on investment are in a range that compares well to that benchmark. There is also a diversification argument that because we don’t know which of the things that aid can finance will ultimately prove most important for poverty eradication, aid allocation should hedge its bets. A low single digit percentage of aid allocated to increase the quantity and quality of private investment in low- and middle-income countries seems reasonable.

are-development-finance-institutions-good-value-money.pdf

Are Development Finance Institutions Good Value for Money?

Publish What You Fund has developed the DFI Transparency Tool to improve the systematic and timely disclosure of relevant information by development finance institutions (DFIs). The tool is designed to meet two functions: 

 Provide detailed, granular guidance to DFIs on the information they should disclose. 

 Provide the framework for analysis by which Publish What You Fund will measure DFI transparency in an initial public pilot index in late 2022. 

This DFI Transparency Tool is the culmination of two years of in depth and collaborative research assessing the disclosure practices of the world’s leading multilateral and bilateral DFIs. Further details of our research findings and the rationale for the tool can be found in our Advancing DFI Transparency report. DFIs can improve their transparency by providing comparable, timely, and relevant information for use by a range of stakeholders in line with the specific information fields included in the tool.

Resources

DFI Transparency Index Methodology