By Sally Paxton and Gary Forster | Oct 16, 2024 | Blog

Ahead of next week’s World Bank Annual Meetings, Sally Paxton and Gary Forster discuss the critical role of development banks in mobilising private capital to meet global development goals, and why we still don’t understand what is working. They present new recommendations from Publish What You Fund to fill the current knowledge gap by improving the measurement and disclosure of private capital mobilisation, and stress why action is urgently needed.

Why do we need (more) private capital mobilisation?

There is no shortage of crises today, all of which are creating both unprecedented human needs and significant strains on budgets. While donors of all stripes are being asked to substantially increase resources, there is a clear recognition that public money alone will not suffice to meet the scale of financing needed; the private sector must be an active partner.

Meeting these needs is largely what is behind the push for reform of the multilateral banking system. Some changes have been made, but on the calls for greater involvement of the private sector, including private capital mobilisation (PCM), the progress has been underwhelming. The G20 Independent Expert Group recommended that, by 2030, PCM should be increased to US$240 billion annually. A recent MDB joint report noted PCM reached US$71 billion in 2022, following a period of PCM stagnation at under US$64 billion. This is not the pace of progress that is required.

What is preventing the scaling of private capital mobilisation?

Against this backdrop, Publish What You Fund has undertaken an ambitious, 18-month initiative to tackle the two pressing issues that stand in the way of scaling up PCM: improved measurement and disaggregated disclosure. Our work entailed not only extensive research but more importantly, extensive consultations with the private sector, development finance institutions (DFIs), multilateral development banks (MDBs), shareholders and other experts.

What became clear is that scaling of PCM is hampered by (primarily two) different measurement systems that not only increase reporting burdens but also provide contradictory data on the same investments. Incentives were not necessarily aligned to approaches that best mobilise the private sector and the same instruments were not always treated consistently. Finally, the current level of PCM data aggregation hides insights into what works, distorts the data, and makes serious analysis impossible. We cannot ascertain what works and what doesn’t. Given the unprecedented needs, this status quo cannot be tolerated.

How can we improve the measurement and disclosure of private capital mobilisation?

Today we launch our final recommendation on how PCM should be measured and disclosed. This follows from our initial proposal released in April of this year and a subsequent period of public consultation. If implemented, we believe that both our measurement approach and our model for disaggregated disclosure will transform the understanding of how mobilisation works which, in turn, will help us learn, make more informed decisions, and allocate scarce public resources for maximum impact.

As a result of our public comment discussions, we made four changes to our original proposal. With these adjustments, we think there is now a solid consensus on our measurement approach. But measurement is just the first step. Probably more important is achieving the level of disaggregated disclosure that will allow for much greater understanding, decision-making, and ultimately, the scale of PCM that is required.

Measuring PCM is, frankly, complicated. DFIs play a variety of roles in their efforts to mobilise the private sector. This includes instances where DFI’s lead or play an active and direct role in an investment, but also instances where they are withdrawing from investments to allow the private sector to take their place. We’ve tried to reflect this in our proposal by splitting these roles into different baskets, all of which must be calculated and disclosed separately. Our proposal, which builds on existing work from the MDB Task Force on Mobilization and the OECD, also recommends a consistent approach to measuring PCM that aligns with incentives to promote the most effective investments and captures all relevant instruments and practices.

The changes to measurement will likely boost overall PCM figures. But that will only distort the picture if it is not accompanied by disaggregated disclosure. Discussions around disclosure have taken the bulk of our effort. We’ve talked to a range of private investors who are supportive of our proposal, and do not share the concerns of commercial sensitivity that have been made by DFIs. Our report also highlights where detailed investment data already exists on paywalled sites. Yet we are still met by claims – never detailed – that our disclosure proposal would violate commercial confidentiality. We think that is now mainly an excuse for lack of disclosure. We’ve set out a sensible path forward for mobilisation disclosure that’s achievable and in line with market standards. It calls for more detail on investments, including by sector, country, amounts, financial instrument and the type of organisation being mobilised, but it would also allow for more aggregation for certain instruments where there are legitimate sensitivity claims.

Taken together, these improvements in measurement and disclosure would give us the insights we need to target public money where it is most effective and start to reach the scale of private sector investments needed to meet global development needs.

What are the wider implications of better data?

This time last year, at the World Bank Annual Meetings in Marrakech, Ajay Banga took to the stage to share his vision for a more streamlined, more impactful Bank. His remarks included the following quote:

“We are asking a lot of the private sector. We are asking them to operate in places and in situations that their algorithms and expertise may not extend, on roads the DFIs have travelled for years. And if we are asking others to follow – we should be willing to share our map.”

Yet the maps aren’t forthcoming. The current information gap is preventing donors from judging where and how their scarce funds can be most productively deployed, shareholders from performing their oversight function, private investors from being aware of and informed about investment opportunities, and citizens from holding the banks to account.

This lack of data extends to beyond private capital mobilisation, to include climate finance and even risk data from GEMs, the Global Emerging Markets Risk Database. Disclosure of this data through strong leadership and changes to contracting practices that prevent disclosure would allow for the publication of timely, disaggregated, project level detail so it can be used by a range of actors for a range of purposes. Our proposal, launched today, provides the evidence, analysis, and concrete next steps to enable MDBs and DFIs to share their maps. This is an opportunity that shouldn’t be missed.

“What works: How to measure and disclose private capital mobilisation to increase private investment and close the SDG financing gap” will be launched at an event co-hosted with the Center for Global Development in Washington DC (and online) on 23 October, 2pm EST, 7pm BST.

Transforming our understanding of what works to mobilise private investors

Join us for the launch of the 2024 Aid Transparency Index with @BrookingsGlobal on July 16th.


Time and Date: 9:30 AM - 11:00 AM EDT, Tuesday, July 16, 2024 

Location: The Brookings Institution Falk Auditorium, 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC, 20036

Transparency of data and other information on development and humanitarian assistance helps stakeholders understand where aid is provided, for what purpose, how it is delivered, and what results it achieves. Transparency also promotes collaboration among aid donors and implementers and ensures accountability to citizens of both donor and partner countries.

With the deadline for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) just six years away, many assessments show these global goals off track. Improved transparency in aid and development data has led to tools that assess progress, identify gaps, and highlight where more effort is needed. How can aid and development data meet information needs for assessing and directing SDG efforts? Specifically, how can this data inform decisions about SDG 2 and emergency food needs? How do donor agencies use aid and development data to understand their own and others’ programs, including results and evaluations? What information do countries need for SDGs, what do they currently use, and what is still required?

On Tuesday, July 16, the Center for Sustainable Development at Brookings will host the release of the 2024 Aid Transparency Index in partnership with Publish What You Fund (PWYF). This event will examine the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’S) SDG dashboard, and country statistical data as three essential tools that, when combined, can help countries, donors, and citizens better focus their efforts. The event will begin with an introduction by George Ingram, senior fellow at the Global Economy and Development program. It will be followed by presentations  by PWYF Chief Executive Officer Gary Forster, and by UNDP’s Director of SDG Integration, Laurel Patterson. George Ingram will moderate a panel with representatives from the development community to discuss the Index findings.

Viewers can submit questions via events@brookings.edu or by using the hashtag #2024Index on X (formerly known as Twitter).

 Launch of the 2024 Aid Transparency Index - Aid data, impact, and the Sustainable Development Goals

Since the establishment of the International Development Association’s (IDA’s) Private Sector Window (PSW), there have been concerns about its structure, use of blended finance, and the inability to measure its progress and impact. With the start of IDA21 replenishment discussions, it is an appropriate time to analyze the PSW – especially to understand whether and how it is mobilizing the private sector. And in the context of broader MDB reform efforts, how do we scale up private capital mobilization to close the significant financial gaps needed to meet the Sustainable Development Goals?

During IDA’s 18th replenishment in 2017, the Private Sector Window was established with US$2.5 billion to be run through the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IDA 19th replenishment made the same US$2.5 billion commitment. In response to COVID-19’s pandemic shocks on poverty, growth, food insecurity, and vulnerable populations, IDA 20 was moved forward by one year. The PSW increased to US$3.0 billion.

The purpose of the PSW is to provide blended finance – concessional resources mixed with private money – to enable IFC, MIGA, and private investors to take on high risk investments in both IDA and fragile and conflict affected countries. PSW investments need to conform to certain eligibility criteria, including adherence to the DFI Enhanced Blended Concessional Finance Principles for Private Sector Projects. The second of these principles requires development finance institutions (DFIs) to crowd in private finance through catalyzing market development and mobilizing the private sector with minimal concessional financing.

Early concerns about the Private Sector Window

The PSW has been a topic of considerable concern from both civil society and experts. Many raised issues about the use of ODA – a scarce resource – for IFC and MIGA projects, especially given the ever-growing global needs. Additional issues concerned the slow uptake of the PSW. In IDA18 and 19, IDA financial reports showed only one-third of PSW resources had been utilized, leaving valuable IDA resources unused.

Early assessments also raised the question about the extent to which the private sector had been mobilized. Going into the IDA20 replenishment, Publish What You Fund – which is analyzing the transparency of DFIs – proposed two practical solutions to improve the transparency of the PSW: reporting on project level development impact and on private capital mobilization. The underlying rationale was that if the PSW demonstrated how blended finance in high-risk deals could be successful, private investors would be more likely to support comparable deals. Critical to this premise, however, is transparency – which is fundamental to demonstrate impact, showcase successes, and enable stakeholders to learn from failures.[1]

IDA20 and Private Sector Window mobilization

In February 2022, the final report from the IDA Executive Directors on IDA20 contained the following provision:[2]

Moreover, in IDA20, IFC and MIGA will complement the existing project information disclosed to the public with systematic impact[3] and mobilization data for projects benefiting from PSW support.

In January 2024, the World Bank published its Independent Evaluation Group’s review of the PSW, which covered IDA18, IDA19, and IDA20. The review found that the PSW was on track to be fully utilized under IDA20. Further, management’s response to the evaluation reported:

There is also increased leveraging of IDA resources—since inception, $3.9 billion of PSW approvals have mobilized $20.3 billion of additional capital in eligible markets from IFC, MIGA, and other third-party investors, including development finance institutions and purely commercial private sources (as of June 2023). The resulting mobilization ratio of 5.2 times surpassed management’s initial expectation of 4.0. 

Despite this largely glowing review, publication of project level data required under IDA20 has been slow in coming. Since the IDA20 commitment, we have been watching for the publication of both development impact and mobilization data. In April 2024, IFC posted this data on private sector mobilization under the PSW:

In FY2023 there was one project with external mobilization, M-KOPA Holdings Ltd.

For FY2024, which ends in June 2024, we have been told that the IFC is expected to publish at least three additional projects following an internal review.

The published data seems to be at odds with the substantial claims of mobilization made in the independent review.[4] Either there are many more projects that have not yet been identified as mobilizing private capital – or IFC and MIGA, along with other DFIs, are mobilizing themselves much more than the private sector. Given the growing financial gaps needed to achieve the SDGs, shareholders need to be asking the hard questions about private sector mobilization, as well as the value and use of the PSW. The next opportunity comes in a month at the third IDA21 replenishment.

Transparency and private capital mobilization

The above lack of clarity around what is included in claims of PSW mobilization highlights the need for the disclosure of more disaggregated and detailed mobilization data. In this spirit, Publish What You Fund has been working on the broader issues of private capital mobilization – both to improve measurement and disclosure of PCM by all MDBs and DFIs – complete with a proposed solution. There is now broad recognition among a range of stakeholders that increasing private capital mobilization is critical; the Secretary of the US Treasury has called for a “cultural change to accelerate private sector mobilization.” Improving disclosure around the PSW, albeit incomplete, shows that it can be done. But just as with the lack of transparency around the PSW, the current state of transparency around PCM is wholly inadequate to understand, analyze, and learn how best to drive private sector investment. Without a real change to transparency practices, current PCM practices will never deliver the scale of financing necessary to meet global demands.

[1] This proposal built upon a commitment by IFC and MIGA to improve “disclosure processes to be more in line with IDA’s public sector practices.”

[3] IFC is working on upgrades to the AIM Navigator system which is scheduled to go live this summer and is supposed to provide project results data, including qualitative assessments, additionality, and indicators.

[4] Adding to the confusion, IFC seems to have utilized its “core mobilization” measurement for PSW projects (akin to private direct mobilization) which is a different measure from the current MDB Joint Methodology used by a number of MDBs and DFIs, developed through work on the MDB Task Force on Mobilization and led by IFC.

Is IDA’s Private Sector Window mobilizing the private sector?

BY GARY FORSTER AND GUEST | APR 11, 2024 | BLOG

By Gary Forster (CEO, Publish What You Fund) and Nancy Lee (Director, Sustainable Development Finance and Senior Policy Fellow, Center for Global Development)

This blog first appeared on the Center for Global Development website.

With growing calls for both more and better targeted development finance to address rising global needs, private capital mobilisation (PCM) provides an essential part of the solution to closing the finance gaps to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Only last year the G20’s Independent Expert Group called for greatly increased levels of PCM, arguing that:

[Multilateral development banks] MDBs should work systematically with the private sector to increase private financing by an additional $500 billion by 2030 including by increasing total private capital mobilisation from $60 billion to $240 billion, and making concerted efforts to catalyze a significant volume of additional private finance.

That goal stands in stark contrast to current PCM rates that have largely stagnated in recent years, hovering just above US$63 billion annually (see data here and here). Development finance institutions (DFIs) need to take significant new steps and pursue new approaches to reach the required scale. For this to happen, accurate measurement and disclosure of PCM data is necessary, so that DFIs and their stakeholders can better identify the most effective mechanisms for increasing the flow of private capital to emerging and developing economies (EMDEs).

Existing measurement and disclosure of PCM—what don’t we know?

There are currently two prevailing methodologies for calculating PCM—the MDB approach and the OECD approach. Both approaches have developed over time and contributed significantly to better understanding of the ways in which private capital is mobilised for development. However, they have key deficiencies in both measurement and disclosure that prevent consistent comparison and real analysis.

Firstly, in terms of measurement, both approaches exclude mechanisms that DFIs are increasingly using to raise working capital and to transfer risk to the private sector through secondary transactions. Here a few examples of mobilisation mechanisms that are currently inadequately measured: the amount of private finance mobilised when portfolios of MDB assets are distributed to the private sector; the mobilisation when MDB-invested funds exit their investments; and the additional private finance generated as MDBs begin to sell hybrid capital to private investors. As calls for DFIs to reform from “buy to hold” to “originate to share” business models increase, it is important that the tools associated with these business models are included in measures of PCM and incentivised within the institutions.

Secondly, the transparency of PCM is currently too limited for stakeholders to undertake any meaningful analysis—to understand, for example, what approaches to PCM work in what regions and sectors and with what tools. Insufficient disclosure limits the ability to assess the extent to which DFIs are effectively leveraging their capital and recycling investments. If shareholders are to effectively govern DFIs, and other stakeholders are to hold the institutions to account, it is imperative that the extent and quality of reporting improves. Specifically, in the publicly available data, PCM investments are aggregated across instruments, regions, and sectors. With tens, if not hundreds of deals combined together, and no insight offered as to the types of finance sources being mobilised, the data is unable to provide any real lessons on what works where, and how.

What is needed is a method for better measurement and more disaggregated disclosure. We need to ask ourselves: are we capturing and properly counting all the important sources of PCM and are DFIs disclosing at a level that supports serious analysis?

Next week, CGD is hosting an event to mark the recent launch of Publish What You Fund’s new report: “Crowding in: An advanced approach for measuring and disclosing private capital mobilisation.” The report is the result of nine months of research, multi-stakeholder roundtables and expert working group meetings, and bilateral discussions. It builds on the thinking of experts and leaders (including inside DFIs and MDBs themselves) who have been grappling with how to understand and report on mobilisation as far back as 2015. The report includes a series of specific and implementable recommendations to improve the measurement and disclosure of PCM. While the recommendations in the report are ambitious, initial feedback from stakeholders suggest they are largely achievable. The report has been published as a draft for consultation allowing stakeholders to comment and suggest improvements until mid-June 2024. The intention is then to launch a final version at the World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings.

On the measurement side, the report builds on those areas of consensus within the existing measurement approaches (the OECD and MDB approaches) and introduces wholly new areas. The report argues that the conceptualisation of mobilisation needs to be expanded to include both private investment in MDBs that boosts their SDG finance capacity (balance sheet mobilisation), and mobilisation that occurs when assets are transferred off MDB balance sheets (secondary mobilisation). These avenues of mobilisation are important to DFIs in terms of balance sheet management (generating and freeing up capital for investment) and in achieving mobilisation at scale. To accommodate these new instruments, the report proposes three distinct baskets of PCM:

Balance sheet mobilisation, including private DFI equity, hybrid capital, and DFI bond issuances. These activities encompass the ways in which the private sector may invest in DFIs. As DFIs are encouraged to increase their lending capacity, these instruments will become ever more relevant. The recent hybrid capital issuance by the African Development Bank is an example of the ways in which DFIs can raise private capital at scale.

Primary private capital mobilisation, including direct and indirect mobilisation through co-investment. This basket is broadly aligned to the existing MDB approach to measuring mobilisation. It captures mobilisation that happens at, or shortly after, DFI commitment in investments. Direct primary PCM occurs when a DFI has an active and direct role in attracting private investors in a transaction. Indirect primary PCM occurs when private investors co-invest with DFIs, but the DFI has no active and direct role in arranging the private investment.

Secondary private capital mobilisation, including debt and equity exits, and risk transfers via securitisation or portfolio insurance. These instruments are central to DFIs transitioning to “originate to share” business models, offering the potential to transfer risk to the private sector and free up DFI capital for further investment.

Throughout the recommendations, the report seeks to address concerns about double counting, consistency, and ensuring the DFI effort and mobilised party risk are taken into consideration.

The Publish What You Fund team consulted closely with the private sector on their interests in greater mobilisation transparency and on their business confidentiality concerns. They are the mobilised parties whose contributions to global development are captured in the MDB and OECD reports. By understanding the expectations of institutional investors, family offices, and private equity funds, the report proposes an approach based on reporting the typology of a mobilised party (e.g., international insurance company or regional private equity fund) rather than specifically naming institutions. The report proposes a method for reporting disaggregated transaction level mobilisation data that strikes a balance between commercial confidentiality and the need for disaggregated data. The report argues for disclosure of PCM at the investment level, with data including investment value, total amount mobilised, geography, investment instrument, sector, disaggregated amounts mobilised, and mobilised party typology to be disclosed.

Importantly, while mobilised parties are comfortable with this approach, some DFIs will be reluctant to undertake the major effort needed to revamp measurement methodologies and reporting.  Shareholder attention and views are critical here. They must make clear that this effort is a priority for them, along with harmonisation across MDBs and regular joint reporting. The existing blanket presumption of confidentiality relating to PCM data must change to a presumption of disclosure, with exceptions only where legitimate confidentiality concerns exist.

The proposed balance protects legitimately sensitive information with the need for sufficiently granular information. Critically, improved measurement of PCM without the needed levels of disclosure will significantly weaken all efforts to understand and increase PCM. Business as usual will not lead to the changes in mobilisation volumes that we need to see. Now is the time to improve both the measurement and disclosure of PCM.

Closing data gaps that obstruct solutions to mobilising private finance for the SDGs

BY ALEX FARLEY AND GUEST | MAR 11, 2024 | BLOG

Start with a multistakeholder convening to review, discuss, and then resolve the leading gender equality funding data issues.

By Alex Farley (Publish What You Fund), Fionna Smyth (Development Initiatives), Hellen Malinga Apila (SDGs Kenya Forum) and Mareen Buschmann (CARE International UK)

Many organizations have attempted to track funding for gender equality in recent years and we’ve all reached the same conclusion: The data is a mess.

For well over a decade, there has been mounting political support for advancing women’s and girls’ rights and economic opportunities. Despite this, the current data doesn’t allow us to know whether rhetoric is being matched with effective investments.

In a year when financing for gender equality is high on the agenda, we must find ways to better measure the programs and impact we’re having. If we really want progress on gender equality, we need a new approach.

We propose a focused multistakeholder effort to increase dedicated financing for gender equality, which would put in place the measurements that allow for tracking progress. This would include setting dedicated commitments to increasing funding for women and girls, the organizations that represent them, and investing in gender-equitable structures and systems, such as caring economies.

To track progress we need better systems. Steps to set these up should include a review of all measurement recommendations to date, resolving outstanding challenges, agreeing on where institutions should align versus where they shouldn’t, and agreeing on a path toward full visibility of all gender financing activities and impact.

The issues with tracking gender financing

In 2015, the Addis Ababa Action Plan on Transformative Financing for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment outlined the need for states to “systematically track and prioritize allocation of ODA [overseas development assistance] in support of gender equality and take specific actions to close financing gaps in order to meet new and existing targets on gender equality and women’s empowerment.”

“Under current data, progress is often reported by the number of women a project will reach rather than by impact.”

Many organizations, including Publish What You Fund, the Association for Women in Development, the think tank ODI, Development Initiatives, and CARE, have attempted to track funding for gender equality in recent years. We’ve included a hyperlinked list of some of these resources at the bottom of the article.

The common thread to all these efforts is twofold: 1) there is too little transparency for us to comprehensively understand funding for gender equality, and 2) there are real limitations to the accountability tools that exist to help us do so.

The top three issues that consistently come up are:

The lack of a standardized approach to marking gender projects across all funders as well as inconsistent use of gender marking within funders’ portfolios.

Poor reporting of gender marking at the project or investment level.

Limited understanding of the impact of gender equality funding.

What we need now is agreement on clear steps that will move the gender commitments forward from piecemeal efforts to concerted action and outcomes.

Understanding how funding benefits women, girls, and gender minorities, rather than just counting them, will require a new results-orientated approach. Under current data, progress is often reported by the number of women a project will reach rather than by impact, such as the extent to which funding has closed the gender gap.

Shifting to a results-orientated measurement approach for gender equality is a first step. Agreeing on specific goals for closing the gender gap, backed up by objectives, gender-specific indicators, and ex-ante and ex-post data at an investment level would set us on the results path. If donors, including governments, articulate specific gender-related goals — e.g., narrowing the gender gap in educational attainment or use of financial services — then the conversation becomes a lot more concrete.

Second, we need to get alignment on what we track and how. Too often as with one of the approaches used — the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee gender equality policy marker — gender measurement is a projection of what is intended rather than rigorous tracking of accountability and results. Further, for most of these investments, gender equality is only a secondary objective, rather than the primary focus.

All of this underscores what was  reported by the World Bank this week — that the gender gap is even wider than thought. With only seven years remaining until 2030, a mere 15.4% of SDG Goal 5 indicators with data are “on track,” 61.5% are at a moderate distance, and 23.1% are far or very far off track from 2030 targets.

2024 is an important year for gender equality funding. This year’s priority theme of the Commission on the Status of Women is “accelerating the achievement of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls by addressing poverty and strengthening institutions and financing with a gender perspective.”

The World Bank’s new Gender Strategy 2024-2030 is due to be launched in the coming months, and the bank’s International Development Association — a critical gender equality funding resource — is also up for replenishment this year.

Calls for more funding for gender equality and women’s rights organizations are loud and backed by evidence. As is the demand for donors to acknowledge and address the gendered harms of approaches that undermine the rights of women and girls, such as budget and fiscal austerity measures that disproportionately undermine women and girls’ access to public services.

This requires inclusive programmatic and impact data that allows us to understand if we are delivering on commitments and achieving meaningful progress on closing gender gaps. Let’s take advantage of the considerable political support for advancing women’s and girl’s rights and economic opportunities and come together in an organized way to resolve these data issues and move forward with catalytic, effective investments.

We propose a multistakeholder convening that will review, discuss, and then resolve the leading gender equality funding data issues.

This group would include funders, gender experts, women’s rights organizations, feminist movements, and data experts, with representatives from all geographies.

Convening these stakeholders should be done in a structured way, supported by an external convenor, that allows for a full review of the issues, resolution of outstanding challenges, agreement on where alignment is and isn’t needed, and then a timetable for implementation.

A successful example of a convening of this type is the G20 Independent Experts Group on Strengthening Multilateral Development Banks, whose report has led to work by the World Bank to overhaul the way it provides guarantees.

For a gender data stakeholder convening, prior to meeting, key participants should be interviewed and input should be used to develop an outline of potential paths forward. The goal is full visibility of gender financing activities and their impact.

Multistakeholder buy-in to this process is an essential element and while gathering groups of this size can be messy, we know from our experience that they give us the best chance to reach a resolution that has wide and sustainable support in real time.

Ultimately, greater transparency is a fundamental prerequisite to whether our funding approaches to gender equality are working and whether our existing accountability and tracking tools are adequate. 2024 is the year to resolve these longstanding issues, to break the impasse, and to ensure that we can finally demonstrate to women, girls, and gender minorities what is being done in their name.  We owe women, girls, and gender minorities this chance.

Some of the efforts to track funding for gender equality to date

💰 Publish What You Fund’s research efforts to map funding to gender equality, women’s economic empowerment, and unpaid care.

🔎 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee member’s GenderNet annual analysis of funding for gender equality and women’s empowerment.

🎯 ODI’s recent effort to map gender-targeted funding in climate adaptation finance.

📖 SEEK Development’s study on funding for women’s economic empowerment.

🌤️ Development Initiatives work on funding for a gender-relevant humanitarian response and gender-responsive climate finance.

📍 The Association for Women’s Rights in Development’s influential macro-mapping of the funding ecosystem for women’s rights organizations.

🗺️ The Lowy Institute’s overview of gaps within the OECD data for gender equality funding and their Pacific aid map.

Gender equality funding data is a mess. How do we fix it?

BY ALEX FARLEY AND SALLY PAXTON | FEB 13, 2024 | BLOG

The World Bank is expected to launch its Gender Strategy 2024-2030: Accelerate Gender Equality for a Sustainable, Resilient and Inclusive Future in early 2024. Despite accountability being core to the draft strategy, there is very little focus on transparency. This is symptomatic of gaps generally in the Bank’s disclosure policies and practices which we believe needs to be addressed in the final Strategy. Fostering greater accountability not only requires a multi-pronged approach but also will be impossible to deliver without greater transparency. We pose five questions to help readers understand the current disclosure limitations in the Bank’s programmatic support for gender equality and why addressing this shortfall both in the forthcoming Gender Strategy and the accompanying implementation plan is essential.

Publish What You Fund participated in the World Bank’s consultation on its draft Gender Strategy including providing a written submission of evidence and recommendations in November 2023 which we discussed with the Bank’s gender team.

One of the three main ‘shifts’ the Bank highlights in its draft strategy is the need to foster greater internal accountability for gender outcomes. At a high level, the Bank’s gender team envisages moving from the 2016-2023 strategy focus to ‘introduce gender tag/flag with accountability in project design’[1] to an additional focus on ‘complementing the gender tag/flag with a mechanism to strengthen internal accountability for gender results in project implementation’ and ‘enhancing gender outcome orientation in-country engagements as One World Bank’ in the new draft strategy.

We pose five questions to highlight some of the gaps in what the Bank currently publicly discloses about its efforts to advance gender equality. We hope the final Gender Strategy and accompanying implementation plan will take up these questions and provide details on how the Bank plans to address the current gaps in disclosure.

1. How much does the World Bank spend on gender equality annually?

The Bank only partially answers this. The World Bank reported its gender equality funding commitments for FY 2023, under the combined themes of ‘Human Development and Gender Equality’, in its annual reports as USD$14,146 million and USD$12,066 million for the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) respectively. The Bank does not publicly disclose the gender-specific volume of funding as a stand-alone figure which means we cannot identify gender-specific funding amounts.

We recognise that there are numerous ways in which the Bank works to advance gender equality through technical assistance or policy support that cannot and would not be appropriate to capture in funding amounts. However, this doesn’t negate the challenge of not reporting at a programmatic level what the Bank contributes to gender equality.

2. How can I identify which World Bank-funded projects support gender equality?

You can’t. The World Bank discloses the total percentage of projects that are gender-integrated at a portfolio level through the use of its tag/flag approach. The gender tag (IDA and IBRD) and the flag (International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)) are the World Bank Group’s in-house system for ranking projects, programmes and activities which can contribute to closing gender gaps. The Bank claims that in FY 2023 more than 90% of IDA and IBRD investments were gender tagged,[2] while IFC has quadrupled its share of gender-flagged investments and doubled its gender advisory services for the same period.[3]

The Bank does not publicly disclose the gender tag/flag at the project, programme or activity level. As such there is also no way to filter and search for gender tagged projects within the World Bank’s Project and Operations data, using the gender tag/flag.

The Bank sometimes indicates where the ‘gender theme’[4] has been applied on project pages as an indication of the level of gender intentionality for a given project. However, the application of the ‘gender theme’ is a separate process from the application of the gender tag.  It is not the equivalent of the gender tag/flag and may be used in conjunction with other themes. While useful for identifying cross-cutting thematic priorities, theme codes are not indicative of funding volume.

3. Where can I find the location of World Bank gender equality projects and investments?

You can’t. Given that the World Bank does not disclose which projects have been assigned the gender tag/flag at the project, programme or activity level, we cannot comprehensively map where gender equality projects are located.

4. Can I see a sector breakdown for World Bank gender equality projects and investments?

No. Similarly to location, without comprehensive disclosure of the gender tagging at a project level we cannot confidently identify how the Bank supports gender equality across sectors.

5. What is the impact of World Bank projects on closing gender gaps?

It’s difficult to find consistent publication of results information, including gender-specific objectives (ex-ante data), or how it performs against these objectives (ex-post) at a project level. The World Bank performs comparatively well in its disclosure of results information in our DFI Transparency Index and Aid Transparency Index. Despite this, when it comes to gender projects, it is less clear from the information available how projects are benefitting women, so much as counting them. This makes accountability and learning a much larger challenge.[5]

It’s time to address gaps in the transparency of the Bank’s gender support.

We welcome the World Bank’s focus on accountability in the draft gender strategy but urge the Bank to recognise the central role of transparency in delivering this objective. The Bank’s efforts to move towards a results-orientated approach which pays greater attention to implementation and results is welcome.

Fundamental to achieving this shift to accountability is ensuring that the Bank gets the basics right – including disclosing basic project information, such as which projects, activities or programmes qualify as gender tagged/flagged and why. These investments should be identifiable in the Bank’s projects and operations data. Such investment level disclosure would provide greater insight into how the Bank supports gender equality with information on location, sector, instrument or funding type, objectives, and importantly ex-ante and ex-post data.

Our recent submission to the World Bank’s consultation process for the Gender Strategy outlines detailed recommendations on how the Bank should improve its disclosure practices in its final Gender Strategy and the implementation plan that will follow. Without these changes, the World Bank is falling behind other funders in its disclosure of gender funding.

[1] The World Bank’s Gender Tag or Flag is the Bank’s internal system for ranking all projects according to whether they address gender equality. The World Bank has not published a guidance note or methodology for how it applies the Gender Tag or Flag approach.

[2] World Bank gender Strategy 2024-2030,: Consultation Draft, 2023, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/gender/brief/gender-strategy-update-2024-30-accelerating-equality-and-empowerment-for-all

[3] World Bank gender Strategy 2024-2030,: Consultation Draft, 2023, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/gender/brief/gender-strategy-update-2024-30-accelerating-equality-and-empowerment-for-all

[4] World Bank’s gender theme definition can be viewed in it’s Theme Taxonomy and Definitions document, 2016, NewThemeTaxonomyanddefinitionsrevisedJuly012016.pdf (worldbank.org)

[5] The World Bank hosts the Umbrella Facility for Gender Equality (UFGE) which is a multi-donor umbrella facility established to generate knowledge and evidence on transformative solutions for advancing gender equality. The UFEG encapsulates the Bank’s efforts to generate evidence on what works to advance gender equality to influence policy and programme design. The Bank has also produced thematic briefs and retrospective reports of their evidence reviews which can be viewed on their website.

What’s missing from the World Bank’s Draft Gender Strategy? Transparency

2023 has been a challenging year for the aid and development community. However, amid the bad news, there have been glimmers of hope and stories that inspire.

At Publish What You Fund we’ve remained focused on encouraging aid and development agencies to be more transparent about their planning, spending and results. At a time when resources are limited and needs are growing, we believe transparency is still critical for understanding what aid and development finance is having the greatest impact, for knowing if we are on track to meet commitments such as climate finance goals, and for assessing what is needed to achieve change – such as greater locally led development.

We were pleased to see new transparency commitments from the UK government in its recent white paper on international development. After a turbulent few years for UK aid, the government set out its aim for British International Investment – the UK’s development finance institution (DFI) – to become the most transparent bilateral DFI, as measured by our DFI Transparency Index. Prior to this, Paul James, who manages our DFI research, gave evidence on BII’s transparency to the UK’s International Development Committee hearing on the UK’s strategy towards DFIs. During the launch of their annual review, BII CEO Nick O’Donohoe spoke about how the DFI Transparency Index provided an incentive to improve their transparency. The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the top bilateral in the 2023 DFI Transparency Index, also publicly reaffirmed that the DFI Transparency Tool is its guide for the information it continues to disclose.

It was back in January this year when we launched the very first DFI Transparency Index, which revealed that overall, DFIs are not transparent enough, and are not providing evidence of impact, data regarding mobilisation, or proof of accountability to communities. As well as measuring and comparing transparency levels, one of the key aims of the Index is to encourage and guide improvements. So, it’s very encouraging to see BII, DFC and others both use the Index as a benchmark and a stimulus for better transparency. Since publishing the Index, we’ve liaised with the DFC on its transparency policy, engaged with 15 DFIs on specific steps to enhance their transparency, and also produced an in-depth Disclosure Example Book – to help DFIs see what is possible in terms of transparency and overcome perceived barriers. Two DFIs that were assessed in the Index: CAF – Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean and the Islamic Development Bank, have since become members of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI).

In September, we also published new research examining 2X investments to assess what DFIs are disclosing. We found a lack of standardised disaggregated information, which makes it almost impossible to get the granular insights that are needed to measure the value, impact, and progress of gender lens investing. Working with 2X Global, we are advocating for the adoption of our recommendations through its new certification scheme. In November, we responded to the World bank’s consultation on its draft gender strategy, urging it to address gaps in disclosure of project and financial information related to its gender investments.

This builds on our work to develop a new, holistic approach to tracking funding for women’s economic empowerment (WEE), which wrapped up in January. Over the previous two years we worked collaboratively with 55 global partners, advisors, researchers and advocates to pilot the approach in Kenya, Nigeria and Bangladesh, and to track national funding in an additional three countries. We published tools so that the approach could be replicated by researchers, policy makers and advocates, and presented our evidence and its implications in a range of reports – which have been downloaded over 15,000 times. In January, we called on funders to match their political support for WEE with increased transparency to ensure investments are effective and catalytic in advancing gender equality.

Setting a baseline for locally led development

In March, with the support of the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network and its members, we published detailed research to establish an independent, credible, and replicable baseline to measure and track funding for local actors, using US Agency for International Development (USAID) IATI data. Following USAID’s commitment to funnel 25% of its funding to local organisations by 2025, we assessed funding for ten countries over three years and found that only 5.7% of USAID’s funding went to local organisations. This figure nearly doubles (to 11.1%) under USAID’s measurement approach, in part because of a broader definition of local and a smaller definition of what constitutes total funding. If the funding differences are scaled-up to all countries where USAID operates, USAID’s approach would underfund local partners by an estimated $1.43bn per year. Our research helped to put a spotlight on the importance of selecting the right metrics to measure local funding. It was cited by Bill Steiger, former chief of Staff at USAID, in his written testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on localization, while arguing for a more precise definition of ‘local’. Additionally, Oxfam America used our methodology to replicate the research in a further eight countries.

In August we announced which 50 organisations would be assessed for the 2024 Aid Transparency Index. This followed a consultation on the methodology in the spring. Data collection got underway in November, and our engagement with the assessed organisations has already resulted in several agencies re-starting to publish IATI data after significant pauses. The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office recently committed to achieving ‘very good’ in the Aid Transparency Index. It’s rewarding to see that the Index continues to incentivise improved transparency. We’ll see how this is reflected in the results next summer.

Bringing clarity to private sector mobilisation

A topic that seemed to be on the agenda at every conference this year was the need to scale up multilateral development bank (MDB) finance in pursuit of development and climate goals, and in particular the role of private finance in achieving this. But if MDBs are to attract and encourage greater private investment for emerging and developing economies, we first need a better understanding of what funds are currently being mobilised and what is working most effectively. So in April we initiated work to increase understanding around what works to mobilise private investment through improving how mobilisation is measured and disclosed by leading MDBs and DFIs. We’ve discussed the opportunities and barriers with MDBs, their shareholders, the private sector and CSOs, and will publish our proposals in spring next year.

As part of our strategy to make all aid and development finance spending transparent with data that is timely and usable, in September we turned our attention to the transparency of private aid contractors. Despite handling billions of dollars of aid money, the largest players are almost completely un-transparent. The lack of transparency limits our ability to hold private contractors to account, and to understand and analyse international aid flows. We’re advocating for private aid contractors to meet international standards for aid transparency.

We want to thank everyone who has contributed to and supported our work over this year. Together we’re making a difference to the quality and quantity of aid and development data that’s being used. We’ve set out why this continues to matter so much.

This year’s World Bank Annual Meetings in Marrakech largely focused on how the Bank could be bigger, better, and faster in the face of the polycrisis and global challenges that we face.

One important development during the event was the publication of the second volume of the G20 Independent Expert Group (IEG) report “The Triple Agenda”. Taken together with the first volume, the report offers a blueprint for how multilateral development banks (MDBs) can be scaled effectively to increase lending to emerging and developing economies (EMDEs). Central to the reports’ recommendations are the need for MDBs to more effectively catalyse and mobilise private finance in pursuit of development goals.

Why does mobilisation matter? Here, we first take a look at what the IEG said about private sector mobilisation, before outlining three changes that are needed if we are to better understand the mobilisation of private capital and ultimately drive changes that will result in its growth. In short, we need a workable definition and estimate of catalysed private capital, reforms to how mobilisation is conceived and measured, and increased transparency of mobilisation data.

The second volume of the IEG report recommends that:

MDBs should work systematically with the private sector to increase private financing by an additional $500 billion by 2030 including by increasing total private capital mobilization from $60 billion to $240 billion, and making concerted efforts to catalyze a significant volume of additional private finance. This target will be higher or lower for different institutions depending on their context, with higher mobilization rates for private lending arms of MDBs and catalytic agencies like the Climate Investment Funds, and lower rates for agencies that focus more on LICs.

This ambitious target should be welcomed. The additional policy recommendations, including increasing the use of guarantees and making the Global Emerging Markets (GEMS) risk database more transparent, are useful to identify how current mobilisation levels may be increased. It is also helpful to see a target for catalysed capital; to date there has been insufficient attention paid to the ways in which MDBs can help to create the conditions for increase private sector investment in EMDEs. An implied target of US $260 billion (the remainder of the overall target of US $500 billion) suggests that catalysed capital may be greater in volume than mobilised capital.

We cannot escape the uncomfortable fact that the volume of private capital mobilised by MDBs has largely stagnated over recent years. Having reached a high point of US $69.4 billion of private capital mobilised in 2018, volumes have since hovered in the US $63 billion to US $64 billion range since then. To some extent, although not entirely, these numbers may be explained by the economic effects of the COVID 19 pandemic. MDBs have, to date, pursued “originate to hold” business models and been insufficiently incentivised to mobilise significant volumes of private capital, while MDB shareholders have failed to ensure that mobilisation is a priority. A fourfold increase in the mobilisation of private capital will not therefore occur unless MDBs adopt new business models such as “originate to share”, are incentivised to mobilise through the incorporation of targets in key performance indicators (KPIs), and are held to account by their owners.

The need to define and measure catalysed capital

The IEG report recognises the role that catalysed capital can play in ensuring private investment helps to address international objectives, including the sustainable development goals (SDGs). But what is catalysed capital and how can it be measured? Unfortunately, there currently is no adequate answer to this question. The first volume of the IEG report describes the catalysing of capital as:

measures that unblock private investment at the macroeconomic or sectoral level (such as through policy and regulatory changes or institution-building), through complementary public investment or through project development support (such as technical assistance, feasibility studies or early-stage risk capital).

The relationship between MDB activity and private investment can be conceptualised as being on a “spectrum of attribution” in which the causal linkages between the former and the latter vary in strength. Private capital mobilisation would fit in the medium (indirect mobilisation) to strong (direct mobilisation) portions of the spectrum, while catalysed capital would occupy the low portion of the spectrum. The low attribution strength for catalysed capital has perhaps dissuaded MDBs from systemically measuring and disclosing data related to catalysed capital. The MDBs that contributed to the inaugural 2016 MDB Joint Report on mobilisation committed to “continue to explore ways to measure and report on this broader private investment catalyzation”. However, little progress appears to have been made on this commitment to date.

Recognising the current realities of attribution it would be advantageous to agree not only on a definition but a set of guidelines for catalysed private capital – recognising that any measurement is going to be more art than science. A clear and explicit recognition that catalysed private capital data tends towards estimation would possibly make MDBs more comfortable with disclosing these figures.

The need for a better measure of mobilisation

In addition to the need to define and measure catalysed private capital, there is a pressing need to update the current methodologies for measuring private capital mobilisation. Over the last decade, two methods of measuring mobilisation of private capital have emerged; an OECD approach and an MDB approach. While both approaches have made valuable contributions for understanding mobilisation, there is growing recognition that neither approach satisfactorily defines or measures mobilised private capital in a manner that captures all of the ways in which MDBs can leverage private capital.

The OECD and MDB methodologies focus on mobilisation that takes place through co-financing of individual investments. In the case of direct mobilisation, this involves a formal arrangement between an MDB and a private investor, while in indirect mobilisation MDBs are understood to have encouraged private investment by their presence in a deal, in absence of a formal agreement. However, neither methodology considers the possibility that mobilisation may occur either at different points during an investment cycle or at scales larger than single assets. Recent publications from British International Investment and Neil Gregory have emphasised the fact that mobilisation may also occur during or at exit from an investment, and may also be achieved through balance sheet and multiple asset mobilisation.

Why is it important to better capture all methods of mobilising private capital? If we wish to increase the scale of private capital mobilisation – on which there seems to be broad agreement – then it is imperative that we are able to identify the mechanisms that most efficiently contribute to this goal. Since the current methodologies do not measure mobilisation throughout the life of an investment, and focus solely on single investments, we have little evidence regarding the effectiveness of these mechanisms relative to others. Improving the measurement methodology will thus allow analysts and policy makers to guide MDB business models in a way that could maximise future mobilisation volumes.

It is of course possible that expanding the definition of mobilisation will result in larger volumes of mobilised capital being counted with no discernible change in the operations of MDBs. With this inflationary tendency in mind, it may be necessary to revise the targets set out in the IEG report upwards in light of new evidence.

The need for better disclosure of mobilisation data

Finally, improved measurement of private capital mobilisation will only be of value if we see simultaneous improvements in the disclosure of related data. Current disclosure by both the OECD and MDB Joint Reports lack the requisite level of detail to allow meaningful analysis of what works and what doesn’t. The MDB Joint Reports are typically limited to portfolio-level reporting, with sectoral disaggregation limited to the infrastructure sector. OECD reporting is marginally more disaggregated although limitations still exist.

At a minimum, mobilisation data disaggregated by sector, instrument, and geography is necessary to improve transparency. Ideally, mobilisation data would be fully disaggregated, particularly to allow private sector investors insights into the composition of existing deals and to provide a degree of market confidence to increase private participation in MDB investments. We understand MDBs and their clients hold concerns around data ownership and commercial confidentiality which may necessitate a degree of anonymisation in the publication of fully disaggregated data.

At Publish What You Fund we are currently trying to address each of these three issues through our mobilisation transparency project. We are currently in discussion with a range of stakeholders, including MDBs and DFIs, their shareholders, the private sector, and industry experts, to understand the opportunities and barriers to improving the measurement of catalysed and mobilised private capital, and to increasing the transparency of resulting data.

Early discussions and roundtable events that we have held have indicated a broad-based recognition that, while the existing methodologies have served a purpose, they are in need of reform to capture the evolving business models of MDBs. There has also been acknowledgement that opportunities exist to improve the disclosure of private capital mobilisation data.

As we move forward, we will be developing a set of proposals aimed at improving measurement and disclosure of mobilisation data. We aim to launch these proposals in time for the World Bank Spring meetings, so watch this space.

The three changes we need to improve understanding of private capital mobilisation

The Paris Summit for a New Global Financing Pact held in June sought to address the key issues currently facing development finance. The mobilisation of private finance for development outcomes formed a central part of the discussions during the two day event. While this focus is not new, it has been somewhat reconfigured with emphasis placed on the need to mobilise “at scale”. However, without improved measurement and increased transparency, it will be impossible to tell whether or not these new commitments deliver on their promises.

It is also critical that any new commitments – and the metrics used to measure them – do not incentivise investments with greater mobilisation potential at the cost of those which have the greatest impact. More granular transparency would help to minimise this risk and keep the focus on development and climate impact.

“A key question in the mobilisation debate is how stakeholders will be able to monitor progress and hold MDBs and DFIs to account. There is currently far too little transparency around mobilisation rates.”

One of the central outcomes of the summit has been a (re)commitment to mobilise private finance to meet global financing gaps. The summit’s official communique calls on greater efficiency in mobilisation where “Each dollar of lending by MDBs should be complemented by at least one dollar of private finance. Based on this, we expect from them to leverage at least 100 billion dollars of private money each year in developing and emerging economies”. Similarly, a group of thirty countries called on multilateral development banks (MDBs) “to develop relevant and harmonized metrics for private capital mobilization and set quantified targets that reflect their ambition, while also establishing incentives for staff to mobilise international and local private capital”.

If this commitment doesn’t sound particularly new, it is because it isn’t. MDBs ambitiously targeted high levels of mobilisation in a 2015 declaration that financing for development needed to be transformed from “Billions to Trillions” and that the mobilisation of private finance was a key element of achieving this. The leverage ratios implied in this old objective appeared unrealistic to many, and indeed proved to be so. Analysis of mobilisation from the Overseas Development Institute found that leverage ratios from MDB and development finance institution (DFI) investment ranged from $1.06 for every $1 invested in lower middle income countries, to $0.37 for every $1 invested in low income countries. Meanwhile, Charles Kenny declared the Billions to Trillions narrative to be “still dead” in an analysis of the limited mobilisation achieved by the International Development Association (IDA) Private Sector Window (PSW). In comparison to the previous goals, the new target of leveraging $1 for each $1 invested by MDBs appears more realistic, although it still implies an increase from current rates.

One of the key changes in the narrative surrounding the mobilisation of private finance that emerged from the summit was an emphasis being placed on the need to mobilise “at scale”. To date, much of the focus on mobilisation has been through the lens of transaction-level mobilisation, in effect co-investment of MDB resources with private capital. This is reflected in the current methodologies for measuring and reporting mobilisation; both the OECD approach and the MDB joint approach only capture mobilisation that occurs in individual investments. However, the summit notably focussed on a broader array of tools that may mobilise private finance. The thirty-country vision statement called for “expanding the use of innovative risk-sharing tools and platforms with a strong leverage effect”, reflecting a recognition that to mobilise at scale would require solutions and products that are more attractive to investors that are seeking larger participation such as institutional investors and pension funds. These proposals have strong synergies with recent work from British International Investment and from Neil Gregory that have argued for a reconceptualisation of mobilisation to include mechanisms that occur at levels or stages in the investment cycle that are not currently captured by the existing measurement methodologies.

A note of caution is required when treating mobilisation in this way. MDBs and DFIs have long deployed many of the tools and leveraging mechanisms that are now being hailed as pathways to increasing mobilisation. Given that leverage ratios are currently significantly below those required to close finance gaps for achieving the SDGs and in climate finance, it is necessary for these mechanisms to be deployed at greater volume. Otherwise, there remains a risk that we begin accounting for existing mobilisation that to date has been unaccounted for, while failing to change the absolute amounts of private capital that are mobilised.

The need for new data and more transparency

A key question in the mobilisation debate is how stakeholders will be able to monitor progress and hold MDBs and DFIs to account. There is currently far too little transparency around mobilisation rates. Publish What You Fund’s inaugural DFI Transparency Index found that none of the institutions included in the assessment systematically disclosed disaggregated mobilisation data. While MDBs and DFIs have reported aggregate mobilisation data through a joint report, and the OECD maintains a database and periodic reporting on mobilisation, none of these sources contain detailed, disaggregated data. Without such data it is impossible to see which tools and investments are effectively mobilising private capital, which are less effective, and where future efforts should be focused. One of the key outcomes of the summit was a call for “Multilateral Development Banks to examine and possibly adopt relevant and harmonised metrics for private capital mobilization and to set quantified targets at the institutional level within their Key Performance Indicator (KPI)”. While this call is to be welcomed, if the metrics are to be of real use they must also be transparently disclosed.

Publish What You Fund is currently working on the issue of mobilisation transparency. The work has two aims:

To improve measurement of mobilisation to better capture the totality of mobilisation efforts at MDBs and DFIs.

To introduce a new framework for reporting mobilisation for adoption by the leading MDBs and DFIs.

We are currently holding many discussions with MDBs and their stakeholders as we work towards these goals. Our discussions have indicated that there is a recognition of the need for both better and more data that can help MDBs and DFIs and their stakeholders better understand what works, and what doesn’t, in the drive to mobilise private finance for better development outcomes.

Reflections on the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact: more mobilisation promised, but will we ever know if it has been delivered?

Over the course of our work to help development finance institutions (DFIs) improve their transparency practices, we have heard arguments that certain forms of disclosure are not possible. We’ve also frequently been asked to share instances of disclosure by other DFIs. To help address perceived barriers and to guide improved disclosure, our team has compiled the Disclosure Example Book. It is intended to show what is possible in terms of DFI disclosure and we hope it will be a useful resource for anyone working to strengthen DFI transparency.

In January 2023, Publish What You Fund launched the first edition of the DFI Transparency Index. The Index measures the transparency of 30 bilateral and multilateral, sovereign and non-sovereign DFIs. The Index finds that overall, DFIs are not transparent enough. DFIs are not providing evidence of impact, data regarding mobilisation, or proof of accountability to communities. But progress is being made – use of and adherence to the standards laid out in the DFI Transparency Tool are guiding the efforts of leading DFIs who have improved their disclosure over the last two years.

Following publication of the DFI Transparency Index, the team has continued our engagement with the institutions that were assessed. The meetings have been building on our past collaboration as we try to support DFIs in improving their disclosure. We identified areas of potential improvement, and specific recommendations as set out in our individual DFI profile pages. During these meetings a number of DFIs requested examples of disclosure for a variety of data points. Given the numerous and varied requests, the team decided to put together a Disclosure Example Book that demonstrates instances of disclosure for the survey questions and indicators in the DFI Transparency Index.

The team has drawn examples from across the DFIs we assessed for the Index. The Disclosure Example Book includes disclosure by both bilateral and multilateral DFIs.

The Disclosure Example Book is intended to show what is possible in terms of disclosure. By demonstrating disclosure by peer DFIs, the examples indicate that perceived constraints to disclosure can often be overcome. In some cases, our team has been told that disclosure of a particular type of data is not possible, or that no DFI would be willing to disclose such information. However, through the course of our DFI Transparency Index assessments we often identified instances of disclosure which suggest this is not the case. For example, we have commonly been told that non-sovereign DFIs cannot disclose disbursement amounts due to confidentiality restrictions, yet found that the Danish DFI IFU disclose this data. There remain only a small minority of survey questions where our team were not able to identify examples of disclosure.

It is important to note that the examples contained within the example book are not being promoted as models of best practice. As set out in our methodology, some forms of data should be disclosed either to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) Standard or in a format that allows bulk download of data (such as a csv. file). For presentation purposes, the majority of examples contained within the book are taken from the web pages or project and organisational documents of DFIs. We have included a screenshot and a link to relevant information. More generally, given the broad range of disclosure practices, we encourage DFIs to identify the most appropriate way to disclose information, while adhering to guidance from the DFI Transparency Tool and the IATI Standard.

We hope that the example book will be a resource to both DFIs and to other stakeholders with an interest in improving DFI transparency. The document demonstrates that there are existing instances of disclosure for the large majority of data points that are assessed in the DFI Transparency Index. We intend to treat the example book as a living document and will update it with new examples when we identify disclosure of new or additional data points.

For more information, or to suggest additional examples of disclosure in line with our DFI Transparency Index, please contact Paul James at paul.james@publishwhatyoufund.org

DFI disclosure: New resource shows what is possible

Publish What You Fund

Contacts

Sally P. Paxton

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